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I. INTRODUCTION 
A peculiar relationship has existed between the United States and Puerto Rico during 
the past 85 years. This relationship has been the central focus of political debate in Puerto 
Rico. Yet, the essence of this relationship has remained virtually unchanged. A seemingly 
acquiescent attitude on the part of Puerto Ricans has combined with a "let sleeping dogs 
lie" approach by United States policy-makers. The dust has piled up high under the 
post-World War II rug of history, and the case of Puerto Rico has begun to gather 
increasing attention from the international community.! 
* Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. Professor Rodriquez-
Orellana was Assistant Professor and Assistant Dean at the Inter-American University School of Law 
in Puerto Rico before joing Northeastern in 1983. His previous experience also includes several years 
with Puerto Rico Legal Services, having served as a Reginald Heber Smith Fellow, and subsequently 
as staff attorney and coordinator in the Consumer Law Division. During the academic year 1982-83, 
Professor Rodriquez-Orellana did graduate work in international and comparative law at Harvard 
University. 
1 Most notably, the United Nations Decolonization Committee and the Socialist International 
have announced their positions on the status of Puerto Rico. See infra ch. II.B.2. 
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The colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is by now an 
open secret. When the press and other communications media are out of reporting range, 
not even many of the United States' staunchest allies will go to any lengths to deny it. Even 
in Puerto Rico, where "status" is the power of the merry-go-round of internal politics, 
prominent leaders of all political persuasions - independence, statehood, and status quo 
advocates - have by now publicly criticized the colonial nature of Puerto Rico's relations 
with the United States. Furthermore, the international character and implications of this 
U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship has been underscored, ironically, by those Island political 
leaders who have travelled to the United Nations to deny that Puerto Rico's colonial status 
is an appropriate matter for discussion in such international forums. ~ 
Puerto Rico's colonial status has thus become a thorn in the side of U.S. policy in the 
international arena. And while its bleeding is not yet profuse, the discomfort points to a 
potentially dangerous infection with far-reaching effects. Puerto Rico's status will inevita-
bly come to the forefront of public attention, both within the United States and interna-
tionally. 
Although it is necessary to discuss at some length the nature and development of U.S. 
colonialism in Puerto Rico, such is not the main purpose here. Rather, because Puerto 
Rico's history, like that of the rest of Latin America, is inextricably interlinked with the 
United States in a very peculiar way, such a discussion provides the essential background 
for the type of analysis which could help both the United States and Puerto Rico to find a 
constructive way out of the present and increasingly deteriorating situation. 
Puerto Rico will not sink into the ocean like a modern-day Atlantis. Neither will the 
U.S. change its geographical location. Thus, in the absence of world cataclysms, which are 
fortunately not in sight, both will have to learn to live with each other in the same 
hemisphere in a civilized and friendly manner, after re-structuring the bases of their 
present relationship. 
As in a forced marriage which eventually comes to a crisis, the relationship of 
dependency is the problem, not the solution. For Puerto Rico and the United States, the 
marriage realistically cannot go on. When all is said and done, and the hard facts of life 
are confronted by both parties, a divorce by mutual consent is then the only fair and 
civilized solution - with rehabilitative alimony payments and all. 
Ending the unhealthy dependency relationship between Puerto Rico and the United 
States is the solution herein proposed. To guide both parties through this difficult 
transition, one must look to existing precedents and arrangements which have been 
devised elsewhere, such as those existing between other industrialized countries and their 
former colonies. The Lome Conventions of 1975 and 1980 provide such a helpful 
background. The new-born Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) may also be useful in the 
gestation of alternatives for the birth of a new U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship. A new 
relationship will allow the heretofore dependent "partner" to grow and develop au-
tonomously, within a framework of global interdependence. 
I am proposing that the alternatives for a new U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship mUst be 
devised within the context of a juridically independent and sovereign Puerto Rico. The 
thrust of this essay is therefore an exercise in post independence advocacy. For it is only 
in the context of juridically sovereign and independent countries that international 
• In 1978, both Mr. Rafael Hernandez Colon, President of the Popular Democratic Party, which 
defends the existing "Commonwealth" status, and Mr. Carlos Romero Barcelo, President of the 
pro-statehood New Progressive Party, appeared before the United Nations Decolonization Commit-
tee when Puerto Rico's colonial status was being discussed, to express their viewpoints. 
1984] DECOLONIZATION OF PUERTO RICO 47 
relations can realistically work in today's world. And it is only in a realistic international 
context that solutions to the present no-win situation can be devised. 
Puerto Rico is a nation, a Latin American nation, and the problems arising out of its 
present colonial relationship with the United States have obvious international implica-
tions. To suppose that the colonial illness of today can be treated with colonial medicines 
is to allow the condition to worsen. Annexation, on the other hand, is like attempting to 
cure an internal infection with a topical band-aid; it would be, under the circumstances, 
merely a further exercise in self-delusion. 
The reality of interdependence in today's world must not be used as a smokescreen to 
mask Puerto Rico's need for independent juridical sovereignty, either. That type of 
interdependence would be nothing but an excuse for continued economic and political 
domination: 
The interdependence of nations is usually urged as a restraining call over the 
assertion of individual national interests, particularly with regard to third 
world claims .... The "age of interdependence" is here, but there have surely 
been other ages of interdependence, such as interdependence of colonies and 
mother countries, and hegemonic powers and client states. The fact of inter-
dependence does not justify the terms . .. 3 
What has to be understood from the very beginning is that the present relationship 
between Puerto Rico and the United States is not a separate issue from those arising from 
the generalized call for a new international economic order (NIEO). Western European 
scholars and policy-makers have taken a more realistic approach in charting the course 
which present world configuration demands. U.S. policy-makers thus far have been more 
than reluctant to follow suit, especially in the matter of Puerto Rico. One may speculate as 
to the teasons for this ostrich-like attitude. Is it the harmless naivete of expressions such as 
"The United States does not have colonies"? Or is it the candid arrogance of an undip-
lomatic statement, like "Puerto Rico is ours to do with it as we please"?4 Perhaps the more 
enlightened attitude of Western European nations stems from the sense of historical 
awareness evidenced by Romain Yakemtchouk, professor at the University of Louvain. In 
his analysis of how the first Lome Convention brought Western European nations to 
restructure their relationships with other less-developed countries, many of them former 
colonies, Yakemtchouk states: 
Our leaders and our public opinion know that the time of national selfishness 
belongs to the past, they know that they are confronted today with a duty of 
human solidarity, they know that not only moral imperatives, but their well-
understood interests call for the reinforcement of cooperation with poor 
countries .... 5 
3 I. K. Minta, The Lome Convention: A Case Study of North-South Relations 37 (1979) 
(unpublished thesis, Harvard University). 
4 The first of these statements is attributed to Under Secretary of Interior Pedro San Juan, in a 
visit to the Virgin Islands in February of 1982. See, J. Puryear, Puerto Rico: An American Dilemma 
(March 17, 1983) (unpublished paper prepared for the Americas Society Conference on Press and 
the Political Status of Puerto Rico). The second, one would like to think, is the product of mental 
speculation. 
S R. YAKEMTCHOUK, LA CONVENTION DE LOME: NOUVELLES FORMES DE LA COOPERATION ENTRE 
LA C.E.E. ET LES ETATS D' AFRIQUE, DES CARAIBES ET DU PACIFIQUE 9 (1977). The original in French 
follows: 
Nos dirigeants et notre opinion publique savent que l'epoque des egoismes nationaux 
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But moral imperatives in the international political sphere are, unfortunately, not 
enough. If they were, neither apartheid nor colonialism would exist. Nor are good 
intentions or U.N. resolutions sufficient. If they were, there would be no nonself-
governing territories illegally deprived of their right to self-determination and indepen-
dence; and U.N. Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 would have put an end to the colonial 
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States. None of this has happened and 
the United States has been drawing on its power and international IOU's for over 20 years 
in order to block U.N. recognition of the obvious. In spite of whatever lip service 
developed nations like the United States may have paid to self-determination and a new 
international economic order: 
It is self-evident that concessions on the NIEO would only be forthcoming 
when they are in accord with the national interest of industrialized countries, 
or at least not in conflict with this self-interest. Morality and philanthropy 
cannot play an autonomous role in this process. 6 
My contention is that, in the case of the United States, the time for some concessions 
regarding Puerto Rico and the Caribbean has come. For, as regards these two countries, 
the time for an harmonious interplay between moral imperatives and national interests is 
at hand. Puerto Rico has much to gain in terms of opportunities for developing and 
transforming its economy from one of dependence to one of a free nation in true 
interdependence with the United States and the rest of the world, particularly other 
Caribbean nations. The United States has much to gain, both economically and in terms 
of political goodwill, from an independent Puerto Rico on its way to a healthy integration 
as part of a truly developing Caribbean region. The moment is crucial for both nations. 
Independence for Puerto Rico could be the key to setting the international stage for 
policies essential to the well-being of both parties for a long time to come. 
II. PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S.: THE UNCHANGED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
When stating the obvious one always runs the risk of simplistic redundancy; but when 
the obvious is not stated it runs the risk of being overlooked. While it is obvious that the 
international correlation of forces in the world today is quite different from what it was 
thirty-eight years ago, many of today's international tensions stem from the behavior of 
world powers which act "as if" the obvious were not true. 
According to C. Fred Bergsten,7 there have been three "waves" of international 
institution-building since World War II. "The first wave," he writes, "came immediately 
after 1945, with the creation of the United Nations system .... " This system includes a 
host of economic components that are still with us, such as the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
creation of the European Economic Community, by virtue of the Treaty of Rome (1957) 
gave rise to the "second wave." Bergsten identifies the existence of a "third wave" which 
began around ten years ago, and continues to the present. B 
appartient au passe, ils savent qu'ils sont places aujourd'hui devant un devoir de 
solidarite humaine, ils savent que non seulement les imperatifs moraux, mais aussi leur 
interet bien compris militent en faveur du renforcement de la cooperation avec les pays 
pauvres .... 
6 Minta, supra note 3, at 36. 
7 Bergsten, Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions, 30 INT'L ORG. 361 (1976). 
81d. 
1984] DECOLONIZATION OF PUERTO RICO 
According to Bergsten: 
The two political objectives of institution building were (a) the ratification and 
legitimation of the power structure underlying international relationships of 
the time and (b) the integration of newcomers into those relationships. In 
1945, this largely meant codifying U.S. hegemony .... Around 1960, it meant 
an increased role for the now-recovered economies of Western Europe and 
Japan, and incorporation of the newly independent developing countries of 
Asia and Africa. Now it requires new modes of collective leadership and 
sharing the rights and responsibilities of leadership across the entire spec-
trum of nations, including the Third World, on many important issues. 9 
49 
It is precisely in this context that the colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and 
the United States must be analyzed. Accordingly, this monograph will summarize the 
salient points of this relationship in order to present a clearer idea of the economic and 
political structures which characterize it. 
A. The "Showcase" Model 
No one can seriously deny that dramatic changes have taken place in Puerto Rico 
since the end of the Second World War. Puerto Rico's per capita income, for example, 
rose from under $200 in the late 1940s to almost $1,200 by 1967.10 Per capita figures are 
always deceiving, especially in the case of less developed nations, since they are not 
indicative of how that income is actually distributed. Nevertheless for purposes of com-
parison, Puerto Rico's relatively high per capita income, although no longer the highest in 
Latin America, must be cautiously acknowledged. While this per capita figure estimated 
for 1982 at around $3,112 11 is largely due to increased federal transfers to the Puerto 
Rican economy, it can be a useful indicator with regard to other qualitative changes in the 
nature of Puerto Rican every-day life. 
For instance, it is estimated that approximately 93% of Puerto Rican families now 
have television sets. There is one car for every three Puerto Ricans. Although in large 
urban areas, such as San Juan, roads are increasingly inadequate, the over-all system of 
roads is generally good. There are multiple health centers and hospitals throughout the 
Island. Schools have proliferated, reaching most points even in rural areas. Low-income 
housing projects in urban areas have also increased. Federal welfare programs extended 
to Puerto Rico have allowed for a relatively healthy population, free from the shocking 
conditions of malnutrition and physical disease which plague many of the less developed 
countries in Latin America. In short, Puerto Rico has developed a relatively modern 
infrastructure. This places Puerto Rico in a rather advantageous position relative to other 
colonies prior to achieving independence in this post-war period. 
All of this progress has been attributed to "Operation Bootstrap," the economic 
development strategy designed by the governments of the United States and Puerto Rico 
9 Id. at 362. 
10 Unless otherwise specified, the economic data for Puerto Rico is taken from the official 
reports of the Puerto Rico Planning Board for the year in question. [Hereinafter cited as Official 
Reports.] 
11 Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, Progress in Puerto Rico: Facts Calendar Year 1982 19 (1983). This 
figure is much less indicative of economic productivity in Puerto Rico due to the ever-increasing 
federal transfers in welfare programs. For example, in the four years from 1976 to 1980, annual 
direct federal payments to individuals increased from around $1.6 billion to over $2.3 billion. Official 
Reports. 
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in the late 1940s; and to its political "arm," the Estado Libre Asociado - ambiguously 
translated into English as "Commonwealth" status. As pointed out by Berrios Martinez: 
This model became a "showcase" for the United States and some international 
agencies. Here you had a small country which was experiencing rapid rates of 
economic growth following much of what is considered orthodox capitalist 
doctrine: (1) free trade; (2) no obstacles to foreign investment; (3) acting as a 
support agent for private enterprise; (4) the adoption of social, cultural and 
technological norms based on those of a highly industrialized nation (the 
United States); and (5) a party system with periodic elections. Puerto Rico 
became the proposed U.S. alternative to national liberation and socialist 
development of colonial peoples and underdeveloped countries, and it was 
agressively promoted as such. 12 
The model is indicative of the free trade mentality prevalent in the post-war era's 
international economic relations, and the universal benefits presumably accruing there-
from. In this regard, "Operation Bootstrap" and the Estado Libre Asociado could be 
characterized as the idea of the universal benefits of free trade: a "convenient myth," 
... not because it was the truth but because it was nearer the truth than any 
alternative principle, and because general advantage ensues from the exis-
tence of some generally accepted organizing principle .... Yet as is well 
known, the convenience of a myth is no help in resuscitating it once its 
credence is blownY 
The myth of Puerto Rico's "showcase" has cracked and its credence has been blown. 
The model in which Puerto Rico's economic development was encased after the Second 
World War responded to the objectives of U.S. economic policy internationally during the 
first "wave" of institution-building identified by Bergsten. It responded to the ratification 
and legitimation of the power structure underlying international relationships in the 
years following 1945. Politically, also, it responded to the codification of U.S. hegemony in 
that first post-war phase. To the extent that existing international institutions reflect the 
political and economic realities which underlie them, the subsequent phases of institution-
building have by-passed the model which the United States designed for Puerto Rico. The 
present U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship is thus a problem. As Berrios Martinez has phrased 
it, the so-called Commonwealth has become "a political and economic anachronism."14 
1. Setting the Economic Stage for "Operation Bootstrap" 
When the Second World War ended in a macabre twist of history called Hiroshima, 
the United States found itselfthe undisputed political power of the world. By virtue of the 
destruction pervading European nations and Japan, the U.S. was also the undisputed 
economic power. Faced with an almost total absence of competition from tAlese former 
industrial powers, the expanding capitalist economy of the United States went in search of 
investment markets beyond its shores. Conveniently enough for U.S. entrepreneurs, 
there was Puerto Rico, an "unincorporated" territory of the United States l5 within the 
12 Berrios Martinez, Independence for Puerto Rico: The Only Solution, 55 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 561, 569 
(1977). 
13 Hirsch, Is There a New International Economic Order, 30 INT'L ORG. 521, 530 (1976). 
14 Berrios Martinez, supra note 12, at 561. 
15 See, the so-called Insular Cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1901 and 1905. The 
ones considered most important are: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 
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u.s. tariff system, which could be successfully marketed as a "paradise" for North-
American investors. 
Two years after Puerto Rico was taken over by the United States as a result of the 
Spanish-American War of 1898, Congress passed the Foraker Act. 16 Among other provi-
sions, the Foraker Act of 1900, not only included Puerto Rico within the U.S. tariff 
system, but also exempted Puerto Rico from the application of federal tax legislation. 17 A 
few years later, the Jones Act of 191718 completed the picture of U.S. domination of 
Puerto Rico. The second decade of this century saw the U.S. Constitution and Con-
gressionallegislation made applicable to the Island. Currency, defense, citizenship, inter-
national commerce and political relations among other matters, were thus under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States government. 
The ultimate control exercised by the U.S. Congress over Puerto Rico under the 
Jones Act made Puerto Rico, by the end of the 1940s, a safe place under the U.S. flag for 
private investors. The first 40 years of U.S. rule in Puerto Rico, however, did little to 
improve the impoverished conditions of the Island, except to dismantle the economic 
power of what had been the budding Puerto Rican bourgeoisie under Spanish colonial 
rule. This dismantled class was replaced by U.S. absentee landowning interests which 
essentially ruled the economic affairs of Puerto Rico as their own semi-feudal domain. 
Although the Jones Act of 1917 allowed for the existence of a legislature,19 its power and 
jurisdiction were limited to purely local matters. As described by Berrios Martinez: 
The smaller middle-sized estates owned by Puerto Ricans became uneconom-
ical as absentee corporate bodies accumulated vast latifundia centered on 
modern, well capitalized sugar mills and tobacco manufacturing companies. 
Laws were enacted to forbid corporate bodies to hold lands over 500 acres but 
such laws were not enforced against the U.S. trusts and corporations. The 
Puerto Rican landowning classes were decimated, became permanently in-
debted to their corporate masters or led a life of idleness on the income 
derived from land leases. Thus patterns of social, political and cultural lead-
ership were disrupted in Puerto Rico long before the urban industrial devel-
opment of the 1940s and 1950s. 20 
Meanwhile, the predominantly agrarian working classes changed masters. Agrarian 
capitalism was implanted. Politics became subordinated to the interests of large absentee-
182 U.S. 222 (1901); Downesv. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 
(1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 134 (1904); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905). 
The language used by the U.S. Supreme Court with reference to Puerto Rico is particularly 
interesting, within the context of this monograph, in Downes v. Bidwell, supra, at 282: 
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions grave questions 
will arise from differences of race, habits, laws, and customs of the people, and from 
differences of soil, climate, and production, which require action on the part of 
Congress that would be quite unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory 
inhabited by people of the same race, or by scattered bodies of native Indians. 
See also: Ramirez, Los Casos Insulares: Un Estudio Sobre el Proceso Judicial, 16 REv. JUR. DE LA UNIV. DE 
P.R. 121 (1946). 
,. Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191,31 Stat. 77 (1900). 
17 Id. §§ 2-3, 77-78. 1. Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). 
19 Id. §§ 25-40, 958-965. 
20 Berrios Martinez, supra note 12, at 563-564. 
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landholders. As the late Puerto Rican writer and journalist, Cesar Andreu Iglesias, wrote 
III 1968: 
But agricultural development under capitalism is necessarily limited. Hence 
its concentration on the sugar industry. Its growth finally stagnated in the 
1930s with the advent of the world economic crisis. Sugar industry, based on 
latifundia and absenteeism, began to collapse. The present close-down of 
sugar refineries [in 1968] is but the end of that cycle. But [that cycle] had 
already reached its boiling point as the 1940s approached. 21 
By the fourth decade of this century, U.S. investors further realized that this "in-
vestment paradise" could also provide cheap labor, well below mainland minimum-wage 
laws. Finally, since all Puerto Ricans since 1917 were U.S. citizens, potential social "ten-
sions" caused by unemployment could be minimized on the Island via the escape valve of 
a policy that would stimulate migration to the mainland. 22 
Hence we see that the economic development strategy known as "Operation 
Bootstrap" fit neatly into the realm of what was economically possible and politically 
desirable for post-World War II U.S. investors. There was a conveniently close locus of (1) 
cheap labor, (2) in an "unincorporated" territory under the U.S. flag within the U.S. tariff 
system, (3) in a world where the U.S. held the upper hand in the economic championship 
competition. 
Meanwhile, an old concept, nationalism, began to take hold as an ideology of libera-
tion developed in those areas of the world over which the pre-World War II powers held 
colonial domination. As new nation-states were born, they had to be integrated into the 
new international configuration. 
The United States does not admit to colonial forays, given colonialism's inherent 
contradiction to dearly-held postulates of freedom and democracy. Somehow then, this 
contradiction had to be made to seem to disappear. Thus, U.S. hegemony during this 
post-war era required a form of "ratification and legitimation" for this unincorporated 
territory, as well. 23 
2. Commonwealth: Colonialism-by-Consent 
As a consequence of the class-dismantling which U.S. corporate absentee interests 
perpetrated over the incipient national bourgeoisie under former Spanish rule, pro-
21 Andreu Iglesias, Ef Movimiento Obrero y fa Independencia de Puerto Rico, in LIBERTAD Y CRiTiCA 
EN EL ENSAYO PoLiTICO PUERTORRIQUENO [hereinafter cited as LIBERTAD Y CRiTICA]. Translated 
from the Spanish original: 
Pero el desarollo de la agricultura bajo eI capitalismo es forzosamente limitado. De ahi 
la concentracion en la industria azucarera. Su crecimiento, finalmente, se estanco en la 
decada del treinta con el advenimiento de la crisis economica mundial. La economia 
azucarera, latifundista y absentista, comenzo a venirse abajo. EI actual cierre de las 
Centrales [en 1968] no es nada mas que eI fin de aquel cicio. Pero ya habia lIegado a su 
punto de ebullicion al acercarse la decada del cuarenta. 
22 Berrios Martinez, supra note 12, points out at 569: 
It has been the official government posture that it neither stimulated nor obstructed the 
migration process [which occurred between 1945 and 1964]. However it has become 
abundantly clear from documents which recently came to light that in fact the govern-
ment has a very active migration policy. 
23 Bergsten, supra note 7, at 362. 
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independence sentiment and political movements began to flourish in Puerto Rico. 24 
At the time of the U.S. invasion of Puerto Rico in 1898, this Caribbean island already 
enjoyed a tradition of electoral democracy.25 It was natural, then, that nationalist senti-
ments would find expression in electoral organizations during the first four decades of 
this century. Four such organizations held center-stage in Puerto Rico's political history: 
the Nationalist Party, the Liberal Party, the Popular Democratic Party, and the Puerto 
Rican Independence Party. 
Nationalism developed its mode of radical expression in the Nationalist Party of 
Puerto Rico of the 1920s and 1930s, until the government's effective and violent suppres-
sion of its President, Pedro Albizu Campos, in the late 1930s, and thereafter. 26 
Electorally, the Liberal Party was the strongest organization, obtaining 44% of the 
vote in the 1932 elections, and 46% of the vote four years later. The Liberal Party, 
however, proved a cumbersome tool for progressive electoral struggle which, for complex 
historical and sociological reasons, had found its vehicle for expression in a pro-
statehood, Socialist Party of Puerto Rico headed by Santiago Iglesias Pantfn. Hence, a new 
electoral organization headed by the most radical, pro-independence elements of the 
Liberal Party, obtained its first electoral victory by a slim margin in 1940. 
The Popular Democratic Party (PDP), headed by Luis Munoz Marin under the slogan 
of Ipan, tierra y libertad ("Bread, Land, and Liberty") instituted a series of reforms within 
the existing colonial structure, thus attempting to fuse independence and socialist 
ideologies. But in the 1940s, Puerto Ricans were pushed into the U.S. war effort. The 
crisis served to facilitate the transition from the PDP's 1940 electoral slogan of "Indepen-
dence is just around the corner," to 1944's "The Istatus is not at issue." During the war 
years and afterward, the United States needed to consolidate political power and to 
provide stability for the economic development strategy of "Operation Bootstrap." 
In order to cope with independence advocates within the PDP, affiliation with 
pro-independence organizations was decreed incompatible with PDP membership. Con-
sequently, the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) was organized in 1946, to become 
the largest opposition party in the 1948 and 1952 elections. Part of the strategy for 
neutralizing and defusing the independence movement in Puerto Rico - besides the 
more overt forms of political persecution and repression which coincided with the 
McCarthyist period in the United States - was to "legislate" internationally that Puerto 
Rico was no longer a nonself-governing territory. 
In order to accomplish this, the political arm of "Operation Bootstrap" was devised. 
In 1950, the U.S. Congress enacted Public Law 600 to allow Puerto Rico to draft an 
organic law, subject to Congressional approval. This new organic law would be labelled 
24 In 1913, the Puerto Rico Union Party, the majority party in Puerto Rico during the early 
decades of this century, assumed an anti-statehood and pro-autonomy platform that called for 
Puerto Rico's political process to culminate in independence. See J. TRiAS MONGE, EL SISTEMA 
JUDICIAL DE PUERTO RICO 71-72 (1978). The Puerto Rico Union Party was the historical predecessor 
of the Liberal Party, founded in 1932, which called for independence through the 1930s. In 1922, 
the Nationalist Party came into existence as a radically pro-independence party. See C. ROSA NIEVES 
& E. MELON, BIOGRAFiAS PuERTORRIQUEIiiAS: PERFIL HISTORICO DE UN PUEBLO 54-56 and 15-17 
(1970); Zavala and Rodriguez, Introduction, in LIBERTAD y CRiTicA, supra note 21, at 26-27. See also 
R. BOTHWELL, PuERTO Rico: CIEN AIiios DE LUCHA POLITICA (1979). 
25 The electoral tradition in Puerto Rico could be said to date back to the organization of the 
cabildos (town councils), in existence by the late 18th century. See A. CARO COSTAS, ANTOLOGiA DE 
LECTURAS DE HISTORIA DE PUERTO RICO (SIGLOS XV-XVIII) 491-541 (1971). 
26 See Zavala and Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 26-28, 33. 
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Puerto Rico's "constitution." P.L. 600,27 known as the "Federal Relations Act," retained 
most of the provisions of the old (1917) Jones Act, with a 1947 amendment providing for 
the election of the governor of Puerto Rico by popular vote. The Federal Relations Act 
would allow for some form of restructuring of the local government apparatus. Neverthe-
less, the United States retained all the basic powers that inhere to sovereignty. 28 And 
although Puerto Rico obtained no additional powers, the myth of a new concept in 
association within the federal system was sold to the voters of Puerto Rico in a yes-orono 
referendum. The Estado Libre Asociado was proclaimed on July 25, 1952, on the 54th 
anniversary of the U.S. invasion. 
It is also important to note that in 1952, Resolution 648 (VII) of the U.N. General 
Assembly had itemized the criteria for former colonies to be taken off the list of non 
self-governing territories. These criteria for decolonization included (1) the former col-
ony's capacity to unilaterally modify or dissolve an association with the former metropolis; 
(2) international representation; (3) wide-ranging internal autonomy; (4) absence of 
economic pressure from the metropolis; (5) judicial autonomy; and (6) total power to 
legislate. Under the legal fiction of a simultaneous transfer of theoretical powers (which 
Puerto Rico had never held), the U.S. Congress maintained ultimate power over Puerto 
Rico in all of these areas.29 
Nevertheless, the codification of U.S. hegemony, which occurred in the first wave of 
institution building in the years after 1945,30 assured passage of Resolution 748 of the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1953. By virtue of this Resolution, Puerto Rico was deleted 
from the list of nonself-governing territories. Pro-independence groups (including the 
PIP, by then the second largest political party) that opposed passage of this Resolution 
were denied the right to a hearing. For the time being, therefore, colonialism in Puerto 
Rico appeared to have vanished by consent. 
B. The Failure oj the "Showcase" 
As stated earlier, dramatic changes did occur in Puerto Rico from a few years before 
the Commonwealth's official proclamation to the late 1960s. In the 1950s, the PDP 
consolidated political power and organization through government machinery. Govern-
ment jobs carne as a reward of partisan fidelity. Unfortunately many competent non-
27 Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (1950). 
28 The U.S. Senate Report explaining and recommending passage of the bill which later became 
P.L. 600 of 1950 stated: 
It is important that the nature of [the bill] be made absolutely clear. The bill under 
consideration would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental political, social and eco-
nomic relationship to the United States. 
Quoted in Berrios Martinez, supra note 12, at 567. See also, 48 U.S.C.A. §§ 731-916 (1952). 
29 Regarding the power of the U.S. Congress to discriminate against Puerto Rico under the 
"territorial clause," Art. IV, sec. 3 of the U.S. Constitution, see e.g., Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 
(1980); Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1,3, note 4 (1978). On the restricted powers of the 
Puerto Rican legislature and its vulnerability to pre-emption under the U.S. Constitution, see also, e.g. 
Torres v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Examining Bd. of Eng., Arch., and 
Sur. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976). On the limited powers of Puerto Rico'sjudiciary, and its 
vulnerability to preemption by federal statutes, see also First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Puerto 
Rico v. Registrador de la Propiedad, 83 J.T.S. 22, at 3953; Jose A. Uama v. First Mortgage Investors, 
83 J.T.S. 23, at 3056 (both 1983 decisions). For a partial list of the powers held by the U.S. 
government over Puerto Rico, see Berrios Martinez, supra note 12, at 567, note 3. 
30 See, Bergsten, supra note 7, at 362. 
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partisan Puerto Ricans were thus excluded from positions in which they could have 
contributed much to sound administration. Partisan bickering has continued to charac-
terize the inconsequential changes in political parties' administrations since 1968.31 
As implied by this last statement, the PDP today has lost its once seemingly 
monolithic control. 32 Nor has the economic model survived the events of the last quarter 
century. These two situations are, naturally, inextricably intertwined. 
In 1940, Puerto Rico's GNP was growing at an average rate of 7.6%. In 1950, the 
beginning of Operation Bootstrap's industrialization program achieved an average yearly 
GNP growth of 6.8%, culminating in a fully blossomed 9.7% in 1960. The next decade, 
however, showed how the "bootstraps" had loosened. In a steady decline, average yearly 
growth of the GNP plummeted to 5.4% in 1970, 2.8% in 1980, and in 1982, to negative 
growth: -3.8%.33 
At the international political level, Commonwealth status came increasingly under 
attack by U.S. adversaries from the communist camp at the United Nations, and by new 
nation-states from the Third World who knew about colonialism from their own experi-
ence. 34 Furthermore, since 1978, international rebukes of cloaked colonialism in Puerto 
Rico have become quite clear, even from traditional allies of the United States. 35 
While it is true that one can now employ the wisdom and authority of hindsight, the 
seeds of failure had been there all along. Economic dependency is inherent to colonialism. 
Just as the "miracle" of "Operation Bootstrap" was an exquisitely possible event within the 
post-war context previously analyzed, the political and economic stagnation of the 
"Commonwealth" was the perfectly inevitable result of a model whose basic problem is 
systemic. 
1. The "Boot's Trap" 
The strategy for Puerto Rico's economic development was simple. Given the existing 
relationship with the U.S. after World War II, the PDP government would obtain capital 
for industrial development from U.S. investors. These investors would, in fact, finance 
the production of duty-free goods for the U.S. market under labor conditions and wages 
inferior to those existing in the mainland. The government of Puerto Rico would further 
offer tax-free status to these U.S. tax-exempted investors, along with other subsidies and 
incentives. This strategy hinged on reliance on U.S. funds to finance both the social and 
infrastructural costs of economic development. Since most of the investment capital was 
"foreign" (U.S.), production in Puerto Rico was naturally geared for export. Consump-
tion was consequently tied increasingly to imports. 
3. Although in 1980 the incumbent governor won reelection by a slim margin, the opposition 
PDP won control of the Legislature. Since then, every-day politics involves a barrage of claims and 
counter-claims of discriminatory hirings and firings, and of administrative corruption in the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government. Although at the time of this writing (late 1983), one 
hears unsubstantiated allegations of judicial misconduct, the judiciary seems to have escaped most of 
the "mud-slinging" so far. 
32 It should be recalled that the PDP had been elected to power for the first time in 1940. See 
supra, at 12. 
33 The 1982 figure comes from Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, supra note 11. All others, see, 
Official Reports, supra note 10. 
34 The Congress of Non-Aligned Nations has been a frequent critic ofD.S. colonialism in Puerto 
Rico. 
3S Specifically the Latin American political parties of the Socialist International. See infra, 
ch.lI.B.2. 
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For its success, this model presupposed a double nexus to the U.S. which, at the time 
of its inception, was comfortable to presume. On the one hand, investment in this 
tax-haven would attract labor-intensive industry which theoretically would create jobs. 
Thus a channel for the extraction of profits was created. On the other hand, it was 
presumed that a channel for influx of federal funds could take care of that part of the 
population which which would neither migrate nor be integrated into the labor market. 
Berrios Martinez has stated that: 
By 1967, it had already become evident that the process of industrialization, 
with emphasis on light industry ... had reached its limit. This was caused by a 
number of factors. Puerto Rico was confronted with competition from a 
number of countries in Europe, Japan and from low-salary countries (e.g., 
Taiwan, South Korea, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, etc.), particularly in 
those industries that had been the core of its development: textiles, women's 
clothing, shoes and other light industry. Forced to buy U.S.-imported goods 
at New York prices, labor demanded higher wages. This reduced Puerto 
Rico's absolute advantage in relation to the rest of the world as well as to the 
states of the Union, particularly those of the South. As a result, the govern-
ment looked to capital-intensive, highly polluting petro-chemical industries as 
a means of continuing the industrialization process. 36 
By 1973, Puerto Rico's economy was at a standstill. 37 The heavy industry venture had 
failed to produce the anticipated number of jobs. At the same time, the need for an 
artificial influx of funds grew as the Commonwealth found itself without the means to 
finance government expenditures, given the wide-ranging and indiscriminate tax exemp-
tion of industries. The government of Puerto Rico, therefore, resorted to expanding the 
public debt, and increased participation in the burgeoning federal welfare programs of 
the 1960s. In fiscal year 1959-1960, federal transfers constituted 10% of the gross 
domestic product. Again in 1969-1970, the net figure offederal disbursements remained 
about the same, at 10.4%. But by 1979-1980, this figure had grown to almost 30% of 
Puerto Rico's gross domestic product, over $3.2 billion. 
The public debt figures are equally revealing. Whereas in 1969 the public debt was 
approximately $1.5 billion, by the mid-1970s this figure had grown to $6.6 billion. Puerto 
Rico's public debt has since grown to $8.1 billion in fiscal year 1982. In other words, 
Puerto Rico's public debt increased from 35.4% of the GNP in 1970 to over 60% of the 
GNP a decade later. 
In spite of these policies (or, more precisely, because of them) the economy of Puerto 
Rico has not recovered. From 1960 to 1970, the average income per family, expressed at 
constant prices, increased from $2,539 to $4,013 - a yearly increase of almost 6%. Yet, 
from 1970 to 1980 the increase registered was only 1.5% - from $4,013 to $4,636. In 
1981 and 1982, average income per family decreased 0.6% and 1.6% respectively. 
An already chronic unemployment situation continues to deteriorate. From an un-
comfortable but conceivable rate of 12% in 1973, unemployment reached an incredible 
25.3% in January, 1983. However, given the extremely low rate of participation in Puerto 
Rico's labor force (40.7% in January of 1983) real unemployment is unquestionably much 
higher. 
36 Berrios Martinez, supra note 12, at 570. 
37 For economic data used in the subsequent analysis, see Official Reports, supra note 10, except as 
otherwise indicated. 
38 Bus. Rev. (Special Supplement), July-Aug. 1981. 
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All of this means, on the one hand, that channeling federal transfers to Puerto Rico 
has exacerbated a situation of dependency in which income and productive work bear 
increasingly little relationship to each other. Thus, a growing segment of the population 
earns income without engaging in productive work. On the other hand, the channel 
which extracts funds from Puerto Rico has also been growing. Income from investments, 
mostly profits, dividends and interest to foreign (mostly U.S.) capital increased from $593 
million in 1970 to $4.7 billion in 1982. This represents ajump of 12.6% in 1970 to 37.4% 
in 1982, vis-a-vis Puerto Rico's GNP. 
In short, "Operation Bootstrap" has created "an economy based on a small industrial 
sector with few jobs, a large service sector ... , and the migration (or subsistence on 
federal transfer payments) of an increasingly large proportion of the population."39 Both 
channels are now flooded. 
2. Commonwealth's Uncommon Uncertainty 
Not only have the winds of economic development within a system of complete 
dependence failed to materialize; but also, the purported autonomy of the "Common-
wealth" ship has never reached the port for expansion repairs. If anything, economic 
dependence has eroded what little autonomy colonialism-by-consent could ever have 
hoped for. 40 
Internally, opposition to Commonwealth status began to crystallize around the pro-
statehood parties: the Statehood Republican Party of the 1950s and its 1960s heir, the 
New Progressive Party (NPP). Within the context of the cold war games in which Com-
monwealth was born, and the often-times violent suppression of nationalist forces in the 
1950s and since, it is hardly surprising that opposition would not openly express itself 
through the PIP. Furthermore, the shudder which the Cuban Revolution of 1959 sent 
through the circulation of U.S. capital in the 1960s became a useful propaganda tool with 
which to scare Puerto Rican voters. Finally, the PIP's inability to explain the foreseeable 
crash of an economy based on dependency, at a time when that economy appeared to be a 
showcase, hindered the PIP's effective competition at the polls. Without U.S. support, 
the word "independence" became associated with "hunger," "lack of stability," "com-
munism," and every conceivable "evil" under the Caribbean sun. Ironically, indepen-
dence may be the only life raft available today. 
In light of the negative connotations given to the independence option, and in light 
of the Puerto Rican government measures taken against independence advocates in 
general,41 opposition began to crystallize around the pro-statehood parties around 1956. 
By 1968, when the "bootstraps" of the economy had stretched to the point of weakness, 
the first pro-statehood administration achieved an electoral victory. The inherently in-
equitable condition of colonialism - the making of fundamental decisions in the center of 
39 Berrios Martinez, supra note 12, at 572. 
40 See id., at 568. See also, supra note 29. While the power of the U.S. Congress to discriminate 
against Puerto Rico under the territorial clause has lately been upheld regarding the extension of 
welfare-benefits programs, Harris v. Rosario, and Califano v. Gautier, supra, Puerto Rico's power to 
determine its own fundamental policy has been consistently denied, Torres v. Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico and Examining Board ... v. Flores de Otero, supra. Furthermore, requests in 1959 and 
in 1975 for expanded autonomy which have enjoyed official government support, have been shelved 
into oblivion by the U.S. Congress. 
41 See, Concepcion de Gracia, La Revoluci6n de 1950, in LIBERTAD y CRITicA, supra note 21, at 
257-270. See also, Melendez Rivera, Antecedentes de Maravilla, in EI Mundo, Dec. 10, 1983. 
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ultimate power without the participation of those affected - has been a propelling force 
of the statehood "movement" in Puerto Rico. As a matter of fact, the twice-elected 
pro-statehood governor of Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero Barcelo, has repeatedly stated 
that if the U.S. Congress should deny a Puerto Rican petition for statehood, he would opt 
for independence. As recently as March 17, 1983, Governor Romero Barcelo clearly 
stated his strategy at the symposium on "Press and the Political Status of Puerto Rico," 
sponsored by the Americas Society in New York. As told by attorney-journalist Juan M. 
Garcia Passalacqua, Romero Barcelo: 
declared that he will call a yes-or-no plebiscite on statehood in early 1985 and 
will define the request as one including the retention of Spanish as [Puerto 
Rico's] official language, a 20-year transition period on federal taxes and the 
assumption by Congress of the island's public debt. 
* * * 
If Congress does not approve any of the three conditions, the governor 
intimated, it is possible that the Puerto Rican people may reject any other kind 
of statehood than that including the three conditions. If they do, then no 
other statehood would be acceptable. If that were the case, the governor did 
not elaborate on the option. Yet, it was clear to everybody listening that the 
governor seems ready ... to keep the word he gave to the New York Times 
and to CBS News several years ago, and opt for independence .... 42 
More recently, at a forum on the Future of the Relationship Between the U.S. and Puerto 
Rico, sponsored by the student-run Sociedad Interamericana and the Harvard Law School 
Forum, Governor Romero Barcelo again stated that the 1980s should be, for Puerto Rico, 
"the decade of decolonization."43 
The parity of strength of the pro-statehood and pro-commonwealth parties at the 
polls44 should not lead one to overlook the pivotal role which the P.I.P. now plays. After its 
virtual disappearance in the 1960s, the P.I.P. has returned as a major party for three 
consecutive elections since 1972. If Puerto Rico had a parliamentary system of govern-
ment with proportional representation, the P.I.P. would hold the balance of power. The 
role it now plays is nonetheless a reminder of the attention which any attempt to "solve" 
the status issue must pay to Puerto Rican nationalism. As stated by Berrios Martinez: 
To argue that a well-defined, homogeneous nationality like that of Puerto 
Rico can be assimilated, or that nationalism and the urge for freedom are not 
felt by the immense majority of Puerto Ricans, by pointing to the result of one 
or another colonial election, would be as futile as confusing the size of an 
iceberg with that of its visible tip.4s 
Aside from the uncommon uncertainty as to the meaning of periodic elections in 
Puerto Rico's political arena, other manifestations of the erosion of Commonwealth's 
legitimacy as a political status have also been taking place. 
By 1972, the Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Bar Association, was 
openly expressing itself on the nature of Puerto Rico's "Commonwealth" status. In a 
42 Garcia Passalacqua, Castro, Rockefeller and Harvard, in The Sanjuan Star, Mar. 23,1983, at 31. 
43 At Harvard Law School, April 25, 1983. 
44 In the 1980 elections, the PDP and the NPP both achieved little more than 47% of the votes, 
with the pro-independence vote making up the difference. 
'5 Berrios Martinez, supra note 12, at 582. Also reiterated at the Harvard Law School forum on 
The Future of the Relationship Between the U.S. and Puerto Rico, April 25, 1983. 
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report which was unanimously approved by the Bar's General Assembly, the Bar Associa-
tion Report characterized the Law of Federal Relations46 as "archaic and with clearly 
obsolete provisions."47 It went on to say: 
The statute is of a colonial nature. The "Law of Federal Relations with Puerto 
Rico" does not correspond to the present juridical situation between Puerto 
Rico and the United States, nor does it comply with its presumed objective of 
establishing the relations between the two countries. If the law is to reflect the 
present juridical situation, its total revision is indispensable. 46 
This report constituted the basis for the Bar Association's report a year later to the 
United Nations Special Committee ofthe Situation with Regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples -
the U.N. Decolonization Committee. 49 This 1973 Report traced the history of the Bar 
Association's anti-colonialist stance since 1944,50 based on the principles of sovereignty 
enunciated by its General Assembly in 1962 under prevailing international law . 51 Again in 
1975, the Bar Assocation announced its position on a proposal submitted by the govern-
ment of Puerto Rico to the U.S. Congress for a "New Pact of Association." On the basis of 
its historical stance, the Bar Association's report on this "New Pact" concluded that, were 
the U.S. Congress to enact the limited proposals submitted by the government, such 
modifications would still not comply with the minimum requirements for decolonization 
established by international law. 52 
In 1977, the Bar Association once more expressed itself on the decolonization of 
Puerto Rico. It reiterated and ratified the 1963 Report on the substantive principle of 
sovereignty as requiring that the U.S. Congress transfer all powers over Puerto Rico to the 
Puerto Rican53 people and adopted the principle as an essential procedural require-
ment. 54 It further called for a decolonization process involving a transitional period that 
would guarantee the effective functioning of a Constituent Assembly. Only then would 
decolonized alternatives be presented to the people of Puerto Rico. 55 The report recog-
nized that U.S. military and economic presence (exemplified by military bases throughout 
the Island, and by welfare transfers) in Puerto Rico would decisively affect the free-
48 1 L.P.R.A. 144-146 (1982). See also, 48 U.S.C.A. §§ 731-916 (1951). 
47 COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO, INFORME: COMISION DEL SISTEMA CONSTITUCIONAL 
SOBRE EL ESTUDIO DE LAS RELACIONES jURiDiCAS ENTRE PUERTO Rico y Los ESTADOS UNIDOS 27 
(Sept. 2, 1972). 
48 The original Spanish reads as follows: 
El Estatuto tiene canicter colonial. La "Ley de Relaciones Federales con Puerto Rico" no 
corresponde con la situacionjuridica actual entre Puerto Rico y los Estados Unidos, ni 
cum pie con su presunto prop6sito de pautar las relaciones entre ambos pueblos. Si la 
ley hade reflejar la situacion juridica actual es indispensable su revision total. 
49(;OLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO, INFORME AL COMITE DE DESCOLONIZACION DE LAS 
NACIONES UNIDAS (Aug. 11, 1973). 
50 Id. at 2. 
51 /d. at 3. Basically, the same criteria enunciated in U.N. Gen. Assembly Res. 648 (VII) of 
1952. See supra at 13. 
52 COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PuERTO RICO, COMISION PARA EL ESTUDIO DEL NUEVO PACTO 
ENTRE PuERTO Rico y Los ESTADOS UNIDOS (Nov. 1975). 
53 COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO, INFORME SOBRE REQUISITOS PROCESALES ESENCIALES 
PARA LA DESCOLONIZACION DE PUERTO RICO 5 (1977). 
54 Id. at 6. 
so Id. at 6-7. 
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determination process. 56 The Bar Association Report recommended, therefore, that the 
Constituent Assembly's Organizing Committee seek alternatives that would guarantee the 
free-determination process. 57 
Finally in 1980, the Bar Association made its latest most important pronouncement 
on the colonial situation of Puerto Rico by expressing that, "the process of free-
determination and decolonization must comply with the minimum substantive and pro-
cedural requirements which this Colegio has previously submitted, in 1963 and 1977, 
respectively."58 Most significantly, this Report, which analyzes - among other important 
developments since 1977 - U.S. Presidential proclamations and Congressional resolu-
tions on the so called self-determination policy towards Puerto Rico, states: 
To tell Puerto Ricans that the United States will accept what [Puerto Ricans 
request] is not enough in light of our relations with the United States, since 
none of the requests for reforms proposed by the people of Puerto Rico 
within the last 27 years have been accepted by the official organs of the United 
States. 59 
This expression by the Bar Association is significant for two reasons. First, it was 
"picked up" in influential sectors in both the United States and Puerto Rico. In the United 
States, Jeffrey M. Puryear, of the Ford Foundation, stated recently: 
Because Washington dominates the relationship, it has the major responsibil-
ity for taking the next step toward change. This does not mean that the wishes 
of Puerto Rico should be ignored or that self-determination should be left 
out. It simply recognizes that Congress ultimately will not give Puerto Rico 
Icarte blanche to do whatever it wants, and has the power to enforce its wishes. 
Therefore, it is both misleading and unrealistic to demand that Puerto Rico 
go through the long and difficult process of reaching a consensus until it 
knows which of the many options have a chance for approval. The ball is in 
Washington's court. 60 
In Puerto Rico, Juan M. Garcia Passalacqua, a noted lawyer and journalist, echoed 
the same idea in a thought-provoking lecture delivered at Harvard University on March 
19, 1983, with the suggestive title, Ahora Ie toea al yanqui ("It's Now the Yankee's Turn"). 
And most recently, the idea was further expounded and expanded by Berrios Martinez, 
speaking at the Harvard Law School forum previously mentioned. 6l On that occasion, 
Berrios Martinez proposed a referendum in which all political parties and ideologies in 
Puerto Rico would join together to ask the U.S. Congress to define the specifics in each of 
56 Id. at 8. 
57 Id. 
58 COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PUERTO RICO, COMISION PARA EL ESTUDIO DEL SISTEMA CONSTlTU-
ClONAL DE PUERTO RICO: INFORME DE 1980 (FACTORES QUE AFECTAN EL SISTEMA CONSTITUCIONAL DE 
PUERTO RICO) 49 (Aug. 16, 1980). 
59 Id. at 50. The original in Spanish reads as follows: 
Decirle a los puertorriqueiios que los Estados Unidos aceptaran 10 que solicitan(sic) 
resulta insuficiente a la luz de la experiencia de nuestras relaciones con Estados Unidos, 
ya que ninguna de las solicitudes de reformas propuestas por el pueblo de Puerto Rico 
en los ultimos 27 aiios han sido aceptadas por los organismos oficiales de los Estados 
Unidos. 
60 Puryear, supra note 4, at 10-11. (The speeches and essays presented at the March 16-18, 1983 
Americas Society symposium were scheduled for publication by September 1983, but were not available 
at the time of this writing.) 
61 See supra notes 43 and 45. 
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the range of options it would be willing to grant as a solution to the status problem of 
Puerto Rico. Furthermore, he suggested that the U.S. should make a firm commitment to 
abide by any of the alternatives which the Puerto Rican people could opt for, under the 
Congressional definition of such options. 
The 1980 Report of the Puerto Rico Bar Association is significant, secondly, because 
of its context within more recent developments in the international arena. The uncom-
mon uncertainty of Commonwealth status has been underscored by the positions ex-
pressed by important international organizations and associations. The U.N. Decoloniza-
tion Committee assumed jurisdiction over the matter of Puerto Rico in the early 1970's, 
under G.A. Resolution 1514 (XV) regarding the implementation of the declaration on the 
right of colonies to independence and self-determination. Since 1978, the Committee has 
reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination and 
independence in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV).62 Further-
more, the 1981 Resolution of the Decolonization Committee - and a similar one passed 
in 1982 - recommended for the first time since Puerto Rico was removed from the list of 
nonself-governing territories in 1953 that the issue be again debated in the General 
Assembly. Although these proposals were defeated in the General Assembly, long-
standing allies of the U.S. have either voted in favor or abstained, implying that voting 
patterns may change in the future. 63 
Other important political associations have also expressed their support for Puerto 
Rican independence. At the 1978 Congress of the Socialist International in Vancouver, 
B.C., Canada, the Latin American political parties in attendance signed what has come to 
be known as the "Vancouver Declaration."64 
In 1979, a similar declaration arose out of a meeting held in Oaxaca, Mexico, by the 
same parties who subscribed the Vancouver Declaration, and others who had not at-
tended the Canada meeting.65 The Oaxaca Declaration went further than the Vancouver 
Declaration in that it not only expressed support for Puerto Rican independence, but 
offered to translate that support into economic aid to help the transition of Puerto Rico's 
economy from one of dependence, "/'a una economia de pueblo libre" to one of a "free 
nation."66 
From these meetings COPPPAL67 was born. This association includes some of the 
most important political parties of Latin America: Mexico's ruling PRI,68 Venezuela's 
A.D.,69 Colombia's Liberal Party, APRA of Peru,7° the Dominican Republic's PRD,71 
Jamaica'S PNP,72 and Costa Rica's PLN.73 Again, COPPPAL has repeatedly expressed its 
62 U.N. Decolonization Committee, AlAC.109/574 (1978); AlAC.109/589 (1979); AlAC.109/628 
(1980); and AlAC.109/677 (1981). 
63 E.g., Argentina, Mexico, and Dominican Republic. 
64 Declaration of Latin American Parties Attending the Socialist International Congress in 
Vancouver, B.C., Canada (November 1978). (This information was obtained from the Puerto Rican 
Independence Party, San Juan, Puerto Rico.) 
65 Declaration of Oaxaca, October 10, 1979. (This information was obtained from the Puerto 
Rican Independence Party, San Juan, Puerto Rico.) 
66/d. 
67 Conferencia Permanente de Partidos Politicos de America Latina (Permanent Conference 
of Latin American Political Parties). 
68 Partido Revolucionario Institucional, presently in power. 
69 Acci6n Democratica, frequently in power. 
70 Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, the most important party in Peru. 
71 Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, presently in power. 
72 People's National Party, recently in power. 
73 Partido de Liberaci6n Nacional, presently in power. 
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support for Puerto Rican independence, and its opposition to annexation, and indeed to 
continuing colonialism under any guise. 74 
The uncommon uncertainty of Commonwealth status therefore stems from its chal-
lenge from within, not just by pro-statehood and pro-independence forces; but sig-
nificantly from influential establishment groups such as the Puerto Rico Bar Association. 
The challenge from without comes not just from traditional U.S. adversaries in the 
international political sphere, but from an important body of the most important interna-
tional institution: the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations Organization. 
International political associations like COPPP AL further make it clear that even tradi-
tional allies of the U.S. are pressuring for decolonization within their hemisphere. 
The most notable action by an international political association came in April of 
1983, when the Socialist International Congress75 in Albufeira, Portugal, unanimously 
admitted the Puerto Rican Independence Party as a full-fledged member, and adopted a 
unanimous resolution supporting Puerto Rican independence. 7• 
Finally, symposia such as those held by the American Society in New York in March 
1983, by Harvard Law School's student organizations,77 as well as the proposed study 
currently under way by the well established World Peace Foundation, 78 point towards an 
attempt to raise U.S. policy-makers' awareness of the potential repercussions of leaving 
the Puerto Rican question uncommonly uncertain much longer. 
C. Anatomy of a Failure 
The "Showcase" model of "Operation Bootstrap" and "Commonwealth" status was 
born genetically defective. For it was based on the assumption that world configuration 
would not change, and that Puerto Rico could always depend economically and politically 
on an all-powerful United States. The economic failure has been most succinctly sum-
marized by Puryear as follows: 
The success of Operation Bootstrap has always depended on the combination 
of federal and local tax exemptions, privileged access to the U.S. market, and 
cheap, good quality labor. The formula worked until the mid-l 960s, when the 
Kennedy Round of tariff reductions began to cut into Puerto Rico's compara-
tive advantage, federal minimum wage laws were gradually applied to the 
island, and federal environmental standards began to raise local business 
expenses. The run-up in petroleum prices in the early '70s and the world 
recession in the '80s aggravated Puerto Rico's existing economic difficulties. 
The Reagan Administration's 1981 tax bill, by lowering income taxes and 
amending [IRC section] 936 corporate benefits, decreased the island's attrac-
tion to mainland capital. Now the Caribbean Basin Initiative, by enlarging the 
74 The most recent COPPPAL declaration regarding Puerto Rico dates from the October 1982 
meeting held in La Paz, Bolivia. 
75 The Socialist International includes over 60 socialist and social-democratic parties from 
around the world, many of them currently in power, as in France, Spain, Portugal and Sweden. 
Furthermore, most are traditional allies of the U.S., such as the British and Israeli Labor Parties. 
76 EI Mundo, April 14, 1983. See also, The New York Times, May 6, 1983. 
77 See, The New York Times, April 27, at D-22. 
78 WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, PUERTO RICO: THE SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL POLICY (1983). A 
two-day conference on this topic was held in Washington, D.C., in September, 1983. According to a 
Puerto Rican newspaper account, at least 30 Congressmen sent representatives. EI Nuevo Dia, Sept. 
20, 1983. 
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number of countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market and tax exemp-
tions, would further weaken Puerto Rico's comparative advantage. 79 
63 
In other words, the world which gave birth to the "Showcase" model in the years 
following the Second World War changed. It changed economically in the 1960s with the 
economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan. It changed politically with the accom-
modation and incorporation of newly-independent nations into new institutional ar-
rangements which have outlawed colonialism in the international legal sphere. It changed 
again in the 1970s with the economic integration and political association patterns of 
developed countries in Western Europe and the developing countries of Africa, the 
Pacific and the Caribbean. The latter changes, part of the third "wave" of the post-war 
era, frame the context in which the Lome Conventions must be understood and the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative compared. For we live in an era of a world "balance" made 
uneasy by those industrialized countries caught in the psychological alienation of a cold 
war mentality which most of the world has transcended. The driving force now is toward 
the creation of a new international economic order. 
This new international economic order is a necessity. The countries which prior to 
World War II had achieved industrial adulthood now show the growing signs of the 
wisdom that comes with age. The post-war "infant" nations have now become of age and 
are demanding their rightful share in the world. Yet, throughout these post-war devel-
opments, Puerto Rico follows an uncertain course. Commonwealth status has failed to 
spread its sails to modern winds that could steer it safely from a sea of dependence to 
today's port of independence. And the U.S., to rephrase slightly from an old 1960s song, 
"continues to continue to pretend that life will never change, and flowers never bend with 
the rainfall."80 
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRECEDENTS FOR POST-INDEPENDENCE INTERDEPENDENCE 
A. The New Theater: The World Is But the Stage 
In the new stage of diverging and frequently conflicting international actors and 
directors, U.S. policy towards Latin America has often been erratic, frequently arrogant, 
and mostly neglectful. A Mexican friend once commented to me that every catchphrase 
developed by U.S. policy makers for their policies toward Latin America contained a 
dichotomy which rang with worn sadness in Latin American ears. The "Good Neighbor 
Policy" of the 1930s viewed, in his appreciation, Latin American nations as the "good," 
and the U.S. as the "neighbor." The "Alliance for Progress," he suggested, truly intended 
Latin Americans to be the "allies," while reserving "progress" for the U.S. The healthy 
skepticism which my friend's observations convey could lead one to the observation, based 
on the preceding analysis, that the "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" was meant to leave 
the "common" to Puerto Ricans and direct the "wealth" to the United States. 
Yet, as far as Puerto Rico's relationship with the U.S. is concerned, this skeptical view 
is not completely accurate. For the wealth extracted by U.S. tax-exempt private interests 
has failed to be repatriated, leaving U.S. taxpayers to foot the bill of a Puerto Rican 
economy increasingly on the dole. In addition, the current political climate in Puerto Rico 
has achieved anything but a common objective regarding the Island's political destiny. 
79 Puryear, supra note 4, at 12. 
80 Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel, Flowers Never Bend With the Rainfall. 
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It is clear that the present arrangement between the U.S. and Puerto Rico cannot 
hold its pose much longer. And while it is difficult to visualize how annexation as a State of 
the Union could alter Puerto Rico's economic stagnation in spite of a sizeable Con-
gressional delegation,81 it is simple to see that statehood would increase the economic 
burden on the U.S. taxpayer to keep a dole economy artificially afloat. 
The problem is further complicated from an international political perspective. In 
my experience, I have never met any Puerto Rican living on the Island (all U.S. citizens) 
who has argued for the status solution of her/his preference for any reason other than the 
belief that such preference is in the best interests of Puerto Rico: hardly a pledge of 
allegiance to the United States! Puerto Rico shares with other Latin American nations 
more than common language, culture and historical origins. It shares a nationalist sense 
of identity which, because of the economic constraints of the present colonial relationship, 
has been erroneously channeled into a prostate hood movement which, after 85 years of 
U.S. domination, still has to show the possibility of becoming a lasting majority. 
Besides the internal problems which the annexation of Puerto Rico as the 51st State 
might imply for the U.S.,82 the repercussions in the third stage of post-war institution-
building could have more adverse effects. The historical fears and skepticism of Latin 
America towards the U.S. would be incremented far more than the present hegemonic, 
myopic vision would surmise. 
Writing about this third wave of international institution-building, Bergsten83 has 
noted that, "The basic issue of international relationships for the foreseeable future is the 
tension between the imperatives of international interdependence and the quest to retain 
adequate degrees of national autonomy."84 As Hirsch85 has pointed out: 
The changes that have taken place in the structure of the international 
system, and notably the decline of the dominance of the leading economic 
power, have in an important dimension weakened the organizational 
basis .... The United States is not going to get its old dominance back because 
that would be convenient for the working of international institutions. Inter-
national economic relationships, therefore, are now likely to require more 
explicit organization, more political negotiation, and perhaps more disruptive 
uncertainties than the liberal trading arrangements of the past. That is incon-
venient; it cannot be said on any objective basis to be inferior. The inconveni-
ence is likely to be especially great as long as no agreed new order exists to 
replace the old broken one. 86 
And as has been further argued by Bergsten: 
History has shown that effective international institutions can defuse conflicts 
among nations and promote positive-sum outcomes, and that such conflicts 
8. As a State of the Union, Puerto Rico would have a larger Congressional representation and a 
larger piece of the Congressional budget than 25 of the 50 states. At the same time, its contribution to 
the federal treasury would be well beneath that of the poorest state. 
82 Berrios Martinez has phrased the problem as follows: 
If the Congress should decide to accept Puerto Rico as a state, the United States will be 
faced with a combination of the Quebec and Northern Ireland syndromes that will 
become an open sore for your nation into the foreseeable future, and beyond. 
Paper read at conference sponsored by the Americas Society (March 18, 1983), at 6. 
83 Bergsten, supra note 7 . 
.. Id. at 363. 
85 Hirsch, supra note 13. 
86 Id. at 530. 
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are not only possible but probable in the absence of such institutions. Interna-
tional interdependence is expanding rapidly in a whole range of issue-areas. 
So is its antithesis, nationalist opposition to international approaches. Hence 
a high priority must be attached to the further evolution of international 
institutional arrangements. 87 
65 
Thus, Puerto Rican independence as a first step is not only in the interests of Puerto 
Rico. Puerto Rican independence is also in harmony with economic and political interests 
of the United States. The historical absence of a decolonizing policy on the part of the 
U.S. has further confused Puerto Ricans' seemingly acquiescent attitude towards col-
onialism. The nationalist roots are not dead even among statehood advocates. 88 A clearly 
enunciated U.S. commitment to decolonize Puerto Rico, guaranteeing an economically 
smooth and viable transition to independence, would undoubtedly expose the softness of 
annexationist sentiment. Furthermore, the wiser policy would expose the deep roots of 
nationalism that are alive in Puerto Rico; and in a constructive fashion, it would accom-
plish for the independence movement what destructive political persecution in the 1950s 
and anti-independence propaganda89 thereafter did for pro-statehood organizations. 
What would such a U.S. policy look like? What would have to be its basic features? 
Imagination and good will are the only limits; but in the following section the reality of 
existing arrangements between "mother" countries and former colonies are examined as 
a useful guide. 
B. The Lome Conventions: A Play of Post-Independence Relations 
1. Pre-Lome Developments: The Historical Dress Rehearsals 
The idea of international "free" trade has been around for as long as industrial 
development in liberal capitalism. The sovereign power of nations to impose protective 
tariffs, however, has also been around for at least as long. While the economic history of 
advanced capitalist societies has underscored the periodic prevalence of protectionism 
versus free-trade in these societies prior to the Second World War, the post-war era 
elevated free-trade to the pedestal of a ruling principle among developed nations, at least 
in theory. 
The advent to nationhood of former Western European colonies after World War II 
has resulted in a qualitative change in the application of the free-trade principle. Al-
though the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) seemed to reaffirm 
the principle of free-trade, along with its primary goal of reducing tariffs and other 
barriers to trade, and along with the elimination of protectionist treatment of goods in 
international commerce, a reverse mechanism of waivers to the general principle was 
incorporated from the time of its inception. 90 
The Treaty of Rome (1957), which established the European Common Market 
(EEC), seemed to further reaffirm the free-trade principle by institutionalizing it in the 
context of the original six European nation-states. Since by that time many of the original 
six had divested - or were in the process of divesting - themselves of colonial pos-
87 Bergsten, supra note 7, at 372. 
88 See supra at 18-20. 
89 See supra note 41. 
90 See, F. Kirgis, Jr., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTINGS: DOCUMENTS, 
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 462-474 (1977). 
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sessions, the Treaty of Rome included provisions regarding their economic relations with 
such overseas countries or territories (also known as "Associated states and territories"). 
The central provisions established that these countries or territories would apply to the 
Common Market countries and to each other the same treatment as had been accorded to 
the European state to which it was peculiarly related. 9) Furthermore, each Common 
Market country would apply toward each overseas country or territory with which it had a 
peculiar relationship the same treatment which the Treaty of Rome established for itself 
with regard to each of the other EEC nations. In the development of post-war North-
South economic relations, the principle of reverse preferences - that in return for tariff-
free access to European markets, overseas nations or territories would afford EEC 
countries equal treatment - was thus conceived as a direct outgrowth of free-trade 
notions. 
The Treaty of Rome also institutionalized a notion which is significant in the context 
of North-South relations. It provided that all members of the Common Market would 
contribute to aid required by such overseas countries and territories. The Treaty also 
contained a provision for the eventual establishment of a "Development Fund."92 This is 
significant, for it foreshadowed the open recognition of existing inequalities and the 
inevitability of some sort of arrangement whereby industrialized nations would contribute 
to the economic development of less developed nations in a unique way. The Treaty of 
Rome provisions would be in effect for five years, beginning in 1958. As I. V. Gruhn 
explains: 
During the course of these five years most of the Associated states and 
territories had become independent. With the exception of Guinea all [of 
them] asked that their EEC association be continued. Hence, a new agree-
ment was concluded at Yaounde in the Cameroun Republic in July 1963, and 
subsequently renewed at Yaounde for a second five-year period in July of 
1969. 93 
Other special forms of association with Common Market countries were signed by 
English-speaking African nations which, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this 
work, had not formed part of the Yaounde I or Yaounde II Conventions. The most 
important of these was the Arusha Agreement (signed in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1969) 
between Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, with the EEC. The Arusha Agreement ran 
parallel to Yaounde II, until January 31, 1975. 
The principle of peculiar forms of North-South economic development treaties was 
thus well established by the time the first series of agreements were concluded at Lome in 
1975. As Gruhn points out, however, the European assumption prior to Lome, "appears 
to have been that some form of enlarged (in terms of European and African membership) 
Yaounde Convention would ensue, or if so desired, a looser Arusha-type agreement - or 
perhaps merely a set of trade agreements with the Community .... "94 The European 
attitude, furthermore, was based on the assumption that their role would be limited to 
presenting options to the African nations from which the latter would simply choose. By 
1973, however, African nations under the leadership of Nigeria made clear that such was 
91 Id. at 606-636. 
92 See, Gruhn, The Lome Convention: Inching Towards Interdependence, 30 INT'L ORG. 241, 243-244 
( 1976). 
93 Id. at 244. 
94 Id. at 249. 
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not to be the course of negotiations. A repeat performance of Yaounde therefore would 
not be acceptable. This forced the EEC to drop its multiple-choice approach, and the 
stage was set, at the time of the third phase of international institution-building, for the 
negotiations which gave rise to the first Lome Convention (Lome I). 
2. Lome I: The Curtain Rises 
A significant aspect of the pre-Lome negotiations (which began in Lagos, Nigeria, in 
July 1973) was the degree of political unity achieved by African nations for the first time, 
vis-a.-vis European powers. Wenike Briggs, Nigeria's Federal Trade Commissioner and 
spokesperson for the group, m'ade it clear that African states intended to negotiate jointly. 
A second significant aspect in this Third World unification development for partici-
pation in the formulation and execution of international economic policy was that Carib-
bean and Pacific states contributed further to the strength of joint Third World negotia-
tions. So, for the first time, a unified group of industrialized, developed nations was facing 
a more-or-less unified group of less developed countries from Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific (ACP states). The Caribbeans, according to Gruhn, "contributed greatly to the 
negotiations by taking the political offensive at crucial moments while at the same time 
bringing technical know-how and expertise to lower level technical bargaining sessions."95 
Thirdly, it is important to point out the "genuinely more understanding, sympathetic 
attitude regarding the needs, concerns, and demands of the ACP states"96 which the 
European side showed in the face of ACP unity. The 55 European and ACP nations 
involved in the accomplishment of Lome I made up nearly half of United Nations 
membership, purporting to affect a population of about 510 million people. For these 
reasons: 
The developing association of former European colonies with the European 
Common Market as manifested in the Lome Convention, provides a useful 
case for a study of the capacity of smaIVweak states as formulators and 
executors of international policy in the contemporary international system. 97 
3. Lome I and Lome II: The Plot Thickens 
These three significant aspects would have sufficed to establish an important prece-
dent in international political and economic relations, as the curtain rose over Lome. But 
Lome I pointed in the direction of substantial changes in the quality of international law 
developments which had preceded it. While the Yaounde Conventions gestated the 
principle of reverse preferences conceived in the second wave of international institu-
tion-building of the Treaty of Rome and the EEC, the creature born at Lome was of a 
surprising new breed. And, as with any new-born creature, despite its initial frailty, there 
was no going back into the womb. 
The main provisions of the 1975 Lome Convention, which Lome II (1980) 
reaffirmed, were (a) free access without reciprocity to the European market for goods 
exported from the ACP countries; (b) a stabilization fund (ST ABEX) which would 
compensate ACP countries in the event of reductions in the receipts from the exports of 
their principal, mostly non-mineral, basic products, and a similar mechanism under Lome 
95 Id. at 254. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 243. 
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II (SYSMIN) to deal with minerals not covered by the Lome I mechanism; (c) financial aid 
to ACP countries; (d) the idea of industrial and technological cooperation to reduce the 
ACP states' disadvantage in this area; (e) presumably joint institutions to supervise and 
help in the implementation of the agreements; and (f) an agreement in the form of a 
separate protocol, called Protocol No.3, which provides for EEC yearly purchase of a 
fixed sugar quota at a fixed minimum price. 98 
As Minta has pointed out: 
Underlying the Convention is a recognition of the weakness of ACP econo-
mies in terms of their excessive dependence on unstable commodity earnings 
and their pressing need for industrial development, and a consequent com-
mitment to the economic development and social progress of the ACP states. 
Hence, one of Lome's main objectives has been expressed as the attempt to establish a 
new model for relations between developed and developing states. IOO Minta has pointed 
out, however, that: 
... the significance of the market-access arrangements tends to be over-em-
phasized; first because most ACP exports to the EC fall under the duty-free 
category even without the Convention; second, because the competitive ad-
vantages offered by the available range of preferences appear to be more 
theoretical than real, since they do not seem to have produced any significant 
changes in the volume and pattern of trade - as was the case for most 
products under the preceding Yaounde arrangements ... ; and third, in the 
area of the highest aspirations - that of trade diversification and structural 
economic transformation - any appreciable success may lead to countervail-
ing restrictions if the interests of Community producers are threatened there-
by.IOI 
After analyzing the moderate accomplishments of Lome I, Katharina Focke, the 
official rapporteur on behalf of the ACP-EEC joint Committee, seems to agree that the 
principle of one-way free-trade consecrated by Lome I, "shows generous intentions on the 
part of the Community, although the gesture is more spectacular than effective in 
reality." 102 
Focke further points out, "that even though the Conventions of Lome are exemplary 
in many ways, they provide in the final analysis only a fraction of what is really needed. 
And a drop in the ocean, however exemplary, never had any effect on that ocean."103 
While this is true, many such exemplary drops may nevertheless alter the ocean's envi-
ronmental characteristics. And undoubtedly: 
By clearly and deliberately recognizing an imbalance of obligations between 
EEC and ACP countries, a recognition of pre-existing inequalities was 
brought into the Lome Convention .... It also seems likely that the principle 
of non-reciprocity will for some time to come constitute a precedent for other 
North-South trade agreements. 104 
98 Id. at 248-249. 
99 Minta, supra note 3, at 1. 
100 19 OFFICIAL COMMUNITIES No. L.25 (JAN. 30, 1976), QUOTED IN MINTA, supra note 3. 
101 Minta, supra note 3, at 244. 
102 FOCKE, FROM LOME 1 TOWARDS LOME 2 (TEXTS OF THE REPORT AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY 
THE ACP-EEC CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY) II (Sept. 26, 1980). 
103 Id. at 67. 
104 Gruhn, supra note 92, at 255. 
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4. After Lome: A Theater-in-the-Round 
To think that Lome represents an isolated series of events in "Old World" affairs, 
totally disconnected from the realities of our hemisphere, is to miss the point. It is not just 
the fact that there are "New World" nations from this hemisphere involved in this attempt 
at rearranging North-South relations (the Carribean component of the ACP states); but as 
Hirsch has pointed out: 
The diffusion of economic power, and inability of any single country to 
impose its preferred global system, have brought a need for more specific 
means to bind countries to an international order, of whatever kind. 105 
He then suggests "preferential terms of access for developing countries" 106 as one of 
the means to bind countries to a new international order. This method, of which the 
principle of non-reciprocity is a clear example, he views as among "the most promising 
such instruments," and one which "would also embody a distributional element, but one 
that is widely considered appropriate in its own right." 107 This means, of course, that the 
attempt to restructure international economic-institutional arrangements must have a 
wider application, lest the Lome Conventions prove to be a great idea whose only flaw is 
that it remains mostly an idea. As Focke recognizes: 
In fact the Community will only be able to pursue a coherent and viable 
development aid policy if its special contractual relations with certain coun-
tries, including the ACP countries, are placed in the context of a world-wide 
system of economic relations between North and South. lOB 
For as Gruhn states: 
The industrial states' concern with resources has brought home their depen-
dence on some Less Developed Countries, in order to sustain their own 
industrial and economic well-being. It was self-interest rather than charity or 
naivete which produced the innovative aspects of the Lome Convention. 109 
This should lead to the realization that there is more to the talk of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order than mere rhetoric. The disparities in today's world's economic 
indicators, such as the divergent growth of per capita income in developed and less 
developed nations, imply more than the recognition of industrialized countries' inter-
dependence with less developed countries. These disparities also go a long way towards 
addressing the moral imperatives of the distributional element which a NEIO involves. 
Thus: 
while much of the third world argumentation on these disparities are 
couched in terms of "bridging the gap;" or "catching up" with the developed 
world, or a transfer or redistribution of wealth - giving rise to the prejudicial 
view in certain quarters that LDCs only want to reap the benefits of other 
peoples' hard work and productivity - in reality the thrust of LDC argument 
is not so much in terms of the desirability of securing a share in world 
economic wealth proportionate to their population, through gratuitous trans-
105 Hirsch, supra note 13, at 530. 
106 !d. at 530-531. 
107 !d. at 531. 
108 Focke, supra note 102, at 68. 
109 Gruhn, supra note 92, at 260. 
70 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:45 
fers of other peoples' wealth, as in terms of a desire to secure equitable 
returns from the resources produced by themselves. 110 
The world today is therefore like a theater-in-the-round, ripe for a global perfor-
mance such as that which has begun with the Lome Conventions. While in the Western 
Hemisphere the Caribbean Basin Initiative announced by President Reagan's administra-
tion contains some worthwhile aspects, the rhetoric of the Reagan Administration, if at all 
representative of its underlying mentality, fiercely misses the mark and is headed for 
failure. The consequences of such failure could be far more serious than the feared 
situation it is designed to prevent. In his address before a joint session of the U.S. 
Congress on April 27, 1983, President Reagan declared: 
The countries of Central America are smaller than the nations that prompted 
President Truman's message [before another joint session of Congress in 
1947]. But the political and strategic stakes are the same. Will our response -
economic, social, military - be as appropriate and successful as Mr. Truman's 
bold solutions to the problems of postwar Europe?1l1 
If such an approach to Western Hemispheric problems is the guiding light of the 
Reagan Administration's policies, then, indeed, the obvious changes in international 
institutional arrangements have been forgotten. Did not a GATT begin to develop in the 
same year in which President Truman's quoted address to the U.S. Congress took place? 
Did not a Treaty of Rome lay the bases in 1957 for Yaounde I and II, and did not 
Yaounde lay the bases for the developments of Lome? What must be recalled is that: 
... the Lome Convention indicates that power does not of necessity come out 
of the barrel of a gun or in the form of economic blackmail, but that it can 
come from a careful orchestration of leadership and skill applied within the 
context of a multilateral mechanism and focused on issue areas ripe for an 
incremental systemic alteration. 112 
It is in this context that the Lome precedents in the North-South relations can help us 
focus on U.S.-Latin American relations. Since within the framework of the Western 
Hemisphere, the Caribbean is aptly recognized as of strategic importance to the U.S., the 
case of Puerto Rico, a Caribbean nation and one of the last remaining colonies in the 
world, is ripe for systemic alteration and should not be overlooked much longer. 
IV. A GLIMPSE AT THE "NEW WORLD" 
To most North Americans from the United States, the Caribbean is a region of gently 
swaying palm trees, tropical breezes and crystal-blue waters with white sandy beaches. It is 
a place to think of for a relaxing vacation of exciting, adventurous nights in the casually 
elegant decor of a tropical Hilton while mingling with the friendly natives. 
And yet, the Caribbean is as varied as the number of languages spoken in its 
neighboring regions - from Dutch in Aruba, to French in Haiti, to English in Jamaica, to 
the prevalent Spanish almost everywhere else. It is a region of varying political systems: 
from Cuba's socialist system, to Haiti's feudal-like autocracy; from democratically tradi-
110 Minta, supra note 3, at 15-16. (Footnote omitted. "LDC" stands, of course, for Less Developed 
Country.) 
111 The New York Times, Apr. 28, 1983, at A12. 
112 Gruhn, supra note 92, at 262. 
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tional Costa Rica, to experimentally pluralist Nicaragua; from independent sovereign 
republics of varying sizes like Mexico and Grenada, to colonial Puerto Rico. Economically, 
the region also displays a wide array of infrastructures. Economic production varies from 
petroleum to citrics, to sugar, to manufacturing, to heavy industry. In every country the 
contrast between rich and poor are mirrors of the regional contrast with the rich "neigh-
bor" to the north. 
Varied as the region is, it shares a common problem; the theoretical juridical equality 
of sovereignty (except in Puerto Rico, most notably), and the reality of inequality in 
economic development with the North. The tension which this problem poses has been 
aptly summarized by Yakemtchouk;113 
In particular, the overriding importance of economic inequality of rich and poor 
states, and hence, the affirmation of the principle of non-reciprocity ... poses 
the problem of . . . harmonizing the legal principle of sovereign equality of 
states, which is a basic principle of the international public order. Reclaiming 
the postulate of self-determination, decolonization developed into the ex-
treme fragmentation of state-sovereignties, based not on some form of sub-
ordination, but on the equal sovereignty of states, and as a consequence, it 
would be necessary to find new formulas to reconcile this contradiction 
between the economic realm and the juridical. ... It is through this legally 
egalitarian international order that the essentially unequal economic power 
distribution stands out. 114 
The question is, then, whether in the search for new international institutional 
arrangements in this third phase of post-war economic development 115 based on the 
principle of non-reciprocity, the problem of economic inequality can be solved through 
any means other than the juridical principle of sovereign equality among nations. To say 
"No" highlights the contradiction between national autonomy and international economic 
relations between North and South. But to say "Yes" does not eliminate the contradiction 
either. For to overemphasize anyone developing nation's economic interdependence with 
a developed one is to turn the clock of history back to a justification of colonialism. And to 
overemphasize any developed nation's economic self-sufficiency is to ignore the qbvious 
changes in the configuration of international economic reality. iIII 
Hirsch has written that: 
Economic interdependence that outruns too far the extent of common politi-
cal control, can be an element of international friction rather than harmony. 
Keeping a little apart can at times be the best way of keeping together. 116 
113 See, R. Yakemtchouk, supra note 5. 
114 Id. at 175-176. The original in French follows: 
En particulier, la mise en avant de l'inegaliti economique des Etats riches et des pays 
pauvres, et partant, l'affirmation du principe de la non-reciprocite ... , pose Ie prob-
Ierne de concordance avec Ie principe juridique de I'egalite souveraine des Etats, qui est 
un principe de base de l'ordre public international. Se reciamant du postulat de 
l'autodetermination, la decolonisation deboucha sur la fragmentation extreme des 
souverainetes etatiques, fondees non pas sur une queiconque subordination, mais sur 
I'egalite souvraine des Etats, et des lors, il faudrait trouver des formules nouvelles, pour 
concilier cette contradiction entre l'economique et Ie juridique .... C'est a travers cet 
ordre international juridiquement egalitaire que se profile la distribution essentielle-
ment inegalitaire du pouvoir economique. 
115 See supra at 7. Also see, Bergsten, supra note 9. 
116 Hirsch, supra note 13, at 531. 
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The United States, by its history of interventionism in Latin America throughout this 
century, I17 has not heeded this sound advice. While the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(hereinafter CBI) might provide a good starting-point for the correction of this historical 
course, the essential aspects of this timid gesture are imbued with a myopic cold-war 
mentality that prevents it from achieving loftier, as well as more realistic goals. The U.S. 
continues to act as if the North-South debate over a new international economic order 
were an either/or proposition between East and West, with Soviet socialism at one end and 
U.S. Capitalism at the other. Of particular relevance to Latin America, and the Caribbean 
specifically, is Minta's observation that: 
... the ideological dimension is sometimes presented in pejorative terms, as a 
degeneration towards socialism on the part of the less-developed countries. 
But it cannot be validly asserted that the less-developed countries constitute a 
socialist bloc; as a matter of fact most LDC governments happily accept the 
capitalist framework, and their disillusionment is not so much with capitalism 
as with their meager rewards within the international capitalist system. 118 
The salient characteristics of the CBI, which are presently discussed, point out basic 
impediments to the promotion of economic regional development, and examine its 
potentially benefical aspects. It is necessary to look at the role of Puerto Rico as an integral 
part of the Caribbean in the context of the CBI, and in light of the international legal 
precedents discussed in the previous chapter. For, as Hirsch has stated: 
The changes now in train in the international economy are far from new; they 
are counter-international in part; they are political as well as economic; and 
they are anything but orderly. They are happening nonetheless. 119 
A. The CBI - A Cosmetic Boycott to Interdependence 
On February 24,1982, President Reagan spoke before the Organization of American 
States. He delivered a special message to Congress the following March 17. In both 
instances, Mr. Reagan outlined what he termed a plan for the Economic Revitalization of 
the Clribbean Basin Region. 120 On December 17, 1982, nine months after the President 
had submitted his plan to Congress, the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives 
is reported to have stated that, "The history of our relations with Latin America has been 
a history mottled by recurrent broken promises and benign neglect, raising hopes that 
were then dashed."121 The next day the House of Representatives passed the bill in 
question 260-142,122 but it died a few days later when the Senate adjourned on December 
23 without taking up the measure. 123 But it was foreseeable that this would not be the end 
of the plan that has come to be known as the Caribbean Basin Inititative (CBI). 
Some of the features of the CBI were probably alive in policy-making corridors long 
117 Levey, The Grenada Invasion: A Marine Precedent Dating to 1823, in The Boston Globe, Oct. 
26, 1983. 
118 Minta, supra note 3, at 34. 
119 Hirsch, supra note 13, at 531. 
120 President's Message to Congress Transmitting the Proposed Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act, 18 WEEKLY COMPo PRESS Doc. 323 (Mar.22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as President's 
Message]. 
121 Murray, Caribbean Trade Plan Dies in the Senate, 40 CONGo Q. WEEKLY REp. 3095, 3096 (1982). 
122 [d. 
123 [d. at 3095. 
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before the Reagan Administration took office in January of 1981. And, not surprisingly, 
on April 27, 1983, in his speech to ajoint session of Congress, Mr. Reagan announced that 
the CBI had been re-introduced in the House of Representatives. i24 The Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act came into being as part of P.L. 98-67. i25 
The three main features of the CBI as originally announced by the President were: 
(1) tax benefits for U.S. companies investing in the Caribbean region covered by the CBI; 
(2) an emergency economic assistance appropriation of $350 million for fiscal year 1982; 
and (3) an offer of one-way free trade, which Mr. Reagan labelled the "centerpiece" of the 
CBI,i26 to which the final version refers as "duty-free trade."i27 The first of these was 
never seriously considered by the Congress, and the second was the only one actually 
approved by the House in 1982. The third feature, the "centerpiece," is most relevant to 
this essay as exemplifying the principle of non-reciprocity established at the Lome Con-
ventions of 1975 and 1980. Although all three features are present in the Lome context, it 
is the "duty-free trade" concept which survived the legislative process in the 1983 Carib-
bean Basin Economic Recovery Act that is of central importance for the purposes of this 
work. 
Officially, Latin American response was less than enthusiastic from the beginning. It 
is probably safe to assume that no new birth of enthusiasm is likely to follow the 1983 CBI, 
since it is essentially a repetition of its predecessor. Speaking to the student-run Sociedad 
Interamericana of Harvard Law School on April 13, 1983, the Chief of Staff of the 
Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Jose Luis Restrepo sug-
gested that the tax incentive measures for investment in the region would not allow each 
country to freely direct the application of foreign investment to its economy. The eco-
nomic assistance aspect he classified as "too little and too politically motivated." Neverthe-
less, he characterized the offer of one-way free trade as "extremely positive," although he 
added that, in his opinion, the offer should be extended to Latin America as a whole. 
This restrained response to the first CBI proposal from diplomatic circles should 
serve as an indicator to U.S. policymakers. In other circles, the reaction was outright 
cynical: 
... in the first place, the plan expresses Washington's priority of maintaining 
this region within its sphere of influence for principally strategic-military reasons 
and only secondarily for the direct or indirect economic benefits which it 
might obtain from these countries .... i28 
In the midst of a deepening political conflict in Central America, little attention has 
been paid to the 1983 CBI. Like its predecessor, however, the erected CBI is strikingly 
different from the approach taken by the Lome Convention with regard to North-South 
economic relations. The CBI is a unilateral piece of Congressional legislation to be 
124 The New York Times, supra note Ill. 
125 [1983-1984] 2 CONGo INDEX (CCH) 35.031 (Sept 15, 1983). 
126 President's Message, supra note 119, at 324. 
127 Act of August 5, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, tit. II , 1983 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS (97 StaLl 
384. 
128 Elfuturo de la Cuenca del Caribe segUn la administracion Reagan, 1 INFORME Feb.-June 1982, at 
10-11 [hereinafter cited as El Futuro]. The original in Spanish follows: 
... en primer lugar, el plan expresa la prioridad central de Washington de mantener a 
esta region dentro de su esfera de influencia por razones principalmente estrategico-
militares y solo secundariamente por los beneficios economicos directos 0 indirectos que 
pueda obtener de estos paises .... 
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offered by the Executive to certain Caribbean nations on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis. The 
Lome Conventions were achieved thorough a negotiation process between two camps. 
While it is true that "The ACP states do not constitute a single legal entity, in spite of their 
bloc appearance,"129 it is no less true that ACP states were able to articulate a unified 
negotiating stance vis-a.-vis the EEC because of similar national interests and a negotiating 
history dating back to the Treaty of Rome and Yaounde I, in 1957 and 1963, respectively. 
The CBI, in contrast, provides for multiple bilateral agreements between the U.S. and 
individual Caribbean nations. This is an arrangement quite different in form, substance 
and results from what the wisdom of Rome, Yaounde and Lome precedents would 
dictate. Mr. Reagan's own words regarding the tax credit provisions of the CBl's first 
round in Congress underscore this important difference: 
A country would qualify for the benefit for a period of five years by entering 
into a bilateral executive agreement with the U.S. to exchange information 
for tax administration purposes. 130 
The key words here are "bilateral" and "executive." As the Report of the House Ways and 
Means Committee further indicated then: 
Title I of [the House bill] contains six sections to provide the authorities 
necessary for the President to establish a one-way, free-trade area with the 
countries of the Caribbean Basin. 
The principal provisions of Title I can be summarized as follows: 
* * * 
Section lO 1 provides the basic authority for the President to establish one-
way, duty-free treatment on imports of eligible articles from Caribbean Basin 
beneficiary countries. 131 
The final House version contained similar wording: 
The President may proclaim duty-free treatment for all eligible articles from 
any beneficiary country in accordance with the provisions of this subtitle. 132 
The final version of the CBI herein analysed, however, does not contain the tax 
credit provisions mentioned earlier even though one-way free trade and tax credit 
provisions go hand-in-hand. As Focke observed regarding the Lome provisions of a 
similar nature: 
The rule of free access is meaningless to countries which, at the present stage, 
because of their productive structures, have practically nothing to export to 
the Community. This rule is therefore only of interest to prospective inves-
tors. 133 
Given the fact that "about 80 percent of Caribbean exports currently enter the 
United States duty-free if petroleum is excluded;"134 given the fact that most potential 
beneficiaries are not oil exporters or producers; and given the fact that discretionary 
129 Minta, supra note 3, at 75. 
130 President's Message, supra note 119, at 325. 
131 H.R. REp. No. 958, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as REpORT]. 
132 Act of August 5, 1983, supra note 126. 
133 Focke, supra note 10, at 14. 
134 REPORT, supra note 131. 
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power to designate beneficiary countries has been placed in the hands of the Executive; 
what Dr. Restrepo said of the economic assistance aspect of the CBI is certainly true of the 
final version of the 1983 CBI, as well: it is too politically motivated. 135 These reasons, 
combined with the existing crises in the basic production systems of potential beneficiary 
countries, underscore the basic correctness of the contention that the CBI: 
... has scarce possibilities of success, since it ignores one fundamental aspect, 
among others; subject to the orbit of United States influence, the nation-state 
in Central America and the Caribbean countries finds itself(sic) each day 
further curtailed in possibilities of carrying out a viable project of national 
development that contemplates society as a whole. This won't be feasible 
without a deep transformation in the political and economic structure on 
which the state is based that will allow [each state] to join a regional scheme of 
integration, the only alternative of economic viability.136 
It is thus clear that the CBI drives a wedge against regional economic integration, 
thus decreasing the likelihood of a true Caribbean interdependence. 137 
B. The CBI-Its Redeeming Value 
With the principle of non-reciprocity a firmly established precedent in international 
economic relations between North and South, Mr. Reagan's "centerpiece" one-way free-
trade offer has to be regarded as a positive gesture. The U.S., however, must be willing to 
do more than dip its toe in the turbulent currents of this third phase of international 
institution-building. A higher priority must be assigned to new evolving international 
institutional arrangements. 
No one seriously contends that the U.S. does not have economic and security con-
cerns in the Caribbean. What is lacking, however, is a more nearly realistic appraisal ofthe 
role which the international legal principle of sovereign equality plays in this stage of 
international institution building. The principle of sovereign equality is rooted in history 
and philosophy, in human experience, aspirations, and culture. A better approach to-
wards North-South relations would require that the U.S. understand the existence of 
nation-states as a tool for economic development and the reduction of economic inequal-
ity. As Bergstein has pointed out: 
135 It should be noted, regarding the economic aid provisions, that President Reagan intended 
that $120 million of the requested $350 million should go to EI Salvador (a country which does not 
even have a shore line on the Caribbean). See, President's Message, supra note 119, at 325. 
136 El Futuro, supra note 127, at 11. The original in Spanish follows: 
... tiene escasas posibilidades de ex ito, puesto que ignora, entre otros, un aspecto 
fundamental: sujeto a la orbita de influencia de Estados Unidos, el Estado-nacion en 
Centroamerica y los paises caribeii.os se encuentra (sic) cad a dia mas imposibilitado para 
realizar un proyecto viable de desarrollo nacional que contemple a la sociedad en su 
conjunto. Esto no sera factible sin una transformacion profunda de la estructura 
politica y economica en que se sustenta el Estado y que Ie permita articularse a un 
esquema regional de integracion, unica alternativa de viabilidad economica. 
137 The Reagan Administration's overt support of forces trying to overthrow the government of 
Nicaragua further weakens any possibility of regional peace and development. This results, not only 
from the open hostility towards Nicaragua, but also because of the Reagan Administration's disre-
gard of the Contadora nations' attempts at regional problem solving. Whatever good faith Congress' 
inclusion of Nicaragua in the list of "beneficiary countries" might have had has been rendered 
meaningless by the militarization policies of an Executive who enjoys basic discretionary powers to 
designate beneficiaries under the terms of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. See, Act of 
August 5, 1983, supra note 126, at 384-385. 
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... It is impossible to keep separate the major international economic, and 
even security issues. A return to the earlier postwar situation, in which each 
was handled largely within its functionally narrow framework, appears most 
unlikely .... But excessive linkage makes issues harder to manage technically 
and so politicized that progress becomes much more difficult. And weaker 
countries will inevitably seek to link, to maximize their more limited bargain-
ing leverage. Here a major requirement for any new systemic custodians is to 
suppress their own temptations to link in the interest of achieving substantive 
progress. 138 
The best way for the United States to safeguard its security interests in the Central 
American (Caribbean) region is not to drive a wedge into Central American economic 
linkages. Rather than the divide-and-conquer approach implicit in "bilateral executive" 
agreements, an integrate-and-benefit approach would be in order. 
It should be recalled that the energy crisis of the early 1970s had deeply affected the 
EEC members at the time of Lome I. Moreover, the ACP states had oil. (Nigeria was at the 
time the world's 8th largest oil producer.) Several African nations were uranium produc-
ers - a fact not likely to have slipped from European attention in the quest for alternative 
sources of energy. It is evident that, "From the European side there was more than 
altruism and enlightenment at stake."139 
Thus, for the Europeans a special relationship with ACP today in areas which 
foster the development and economic survival of ACP states may well have 
equally imperative payoffs for the EEC at a future time .... 140 
At present, the worst recession since the Depression of the 1930s should still be fresh 
in U.S. policymakers' minds, as well as the honest awareness that the Carter administra-
tion was not its cause, nor Reagan's the remedy. As Robert B. Reich has pointed out: 
When all industrialized countries were crippled by a worldwide recession in 
1981 and 1982, America [meaning the U.S.] was among the hardest hit, 
suffering slower economic growth and higher unemployment than France, 
Japan, or West Germany and higher inflation than Japan or West Germany. 
America's standard of living has stayed high in absolute terms, in large part 
because its stock of wealth is still immense. But that lead is eroding quickly. 141 
In spite of the previously noted fact that approximately 80% of Caribbean non-
petroleum products already enter the U.S. duty-free, petty arguments, politically in-
spired, were brandished in Congress against the only moderately worthwhile feature of 
the CBI from the beginning. 142 It is time that U.S. policymakers recognize that labor-in-
138 Hirsch, supra note 13, at 366. 
139 Gruhn, supra note 92, at 259. 
140 Id. 
1<1 R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 118 (1983). 
142 See, e.g., REPORT,supra note 130, Additional Views of The Hon. Richard T. Shulze, 36-38, at 
36, regarding the mushroom industry as "an extremely import-sensitive enterprise. Being chiefly 
labor intensive, it has been victimized by a flood of foreign canned mushrooms which are produced 
by cheap labor and are often subsidized by foreign governments in one fashion or another." 
Representative Shulze in fact offered amendments to exclude mushrooms from duty-free access 
under the CBI, which were defeated: 
He added: 
Let there be no doubt as to the reality of that threat. The Dominican Republic, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala and Haiti all currently grow mushrooms ... and Italian and Korean 
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tensive, relatively unskilled production in the U.S. is expensive and counter-economic. 
Importing such articles from other countries who can produce them more cheaply is not 
just in the economic interest of exporters in a non-reciprocal arrangement, but also in the 
economic interests of the U.S. Reich has noted that: 
What began in the 1960s as a gradual shift became by the late 1970s a m~or 
structural change in the world economy. Assembly operations are being 
established in developing countries at a rapid clip, and America's manufactur-
ing base is eroding precipitously. !43 
Such realization, of course, requires a shift in economic strategy within the United 
States. Reich says that, "Too many of us have too much of a stake in the old patterns of 
organization to acknowledge comfortably the magnitude of the shift that must be under-
taken."!44 He then adds: 
America's industrial base must change radically. If American prosperity is to 
be truly restored, a substantial fraction of capital and labor must shift toward 
flexible-system production. But the organization of high volume, standard-
ized production permits change in only one dimension; toward greater scale 
and a larger volume of the same standardized products. !45 
It must be recognized that: 
Goods are being made wherever they can be made the cheapest, regardless of 
national boundaries. And the most efficient places for such mass production 
of standardized commodities are coming to be third world countries. Over a 
period of only fifteen years many of the world's developing countries have 
begun to specialize in high-volume production, featuring long runs of stan-
dardized products. Their production costs are lower than America's both 
because their workers are content with lower real wages and because some of 
them have favored access to cheap materials. !46 
What has to occur is " ... the growing recognition that is pays to cultivate the attitude and 
institutions consistent with the growing reality of genuine economic interdependence on 
this globe."!47 This means getting away from the ideological strait jacket of a cold-war 
mentality, and understanding that there is no security in the absence of Caribbean 
development; that there is no economic development in the absence of true economic 
Caribbean interdependence; and that there is no true economic interdependence in the 
absence of new international institutional arrangements. In short, the road out of eco-
businesses have investigated establishing mushroom operations in the Caribbean. The 
U.S. International Trade Commission has confirmed the feasibility of growing mus-
hrooms in a semi-tropical climate such as exists in the region designated under the CBI. 
Id. 36-37. 
143 R. REICH, supra note 140, at 127. See also Alexander, A Fresh Challenge to Reaganomics, TIME 
May 2, 1983, at 60: 
[Economist Robert] Reich would replace capricious protectionist measures with an 
explicit industrial policy aimed at retraining unemployed workers for new jobs and 
channeling investment into technologically advanced products that would enable U.S. 
companies to keep pace in the growth race. 
144 R. REICH, supra note 140, at 138. 
145 /d., at 139. 
146 /d., at 125. 
147 Gruhn, supra note 92, at 259-260. 
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nomic inequality is precisely through the flexibility which juridical sovereign equality 
alone is able to provide. 
C. Puerto Rico: The Caribbean Counterpoint 
In his March 17, 1982, message to Congress on the Economic Revitalization of the 
Carribbean Region,I48 the President of the United States stated: 
The crisis facing most of the Basin countries is real and acute. Deteriorating 
trade opportunities, worldwide recession, mounting debt burdens, growing 
unemployment and deep-seated structural problems are having a catastrophic 
impact throughout the region. This economic disaster is consuming our 
neighbors' money reserves and credit, forcing thousands of people to emig-
rate, and shaking even the most established democracies. This is not a crisis 
we can afford to ignore. 149 
In this context, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's economic and political uncom-
mon uncertainty stands out as a sore reminder of Latin American skepticism of U.S. 
policies towards the South. Although Puerto Rico has the infrastructure which could be 
the cornerstone of its economic development under freer conditions to act internation-
ally, it finds itself in the anomalous position of having neither economic equality vis-a-vis 
Northern developed countries, nor juridical sovereign equality with anybody. While 
recognizing that the originally proposed CBI would have to take into account Puerto 
Rico's long-standing "special reiationship"150 with the United States, the remedial provi-
sions incorporated into the CBI appear to be ad hoc afterthoughts, rather than part of a 
comprehensive plan to orchestrate Puerto Rico's integration into a progressive Caribbean 
policy. 151 None of the considerations given to Puerto Rico under CBI as originally 
conceived or as finally enacted allow for major structural changes that will improve the 
Island's economy. At best, things will remain systemically as they are: unintegrated with 
the Caribbean, and economically dependent on the U.S. 
But things are not economically good as they are. 152 They are not getting any better. 
The CBI, by allowing juridically sovereign Caribbean countries non-reciprocal, duty-free 
access to the U.S. market could make things much worse for Puerto Rico, unless the 
straitjacket of colonialism were lifted from its shoulders to allow the greater flexibility 
which sovereign equality allows. Independence is the only tool which could facilitate 
Puerto Rico's search for adequately tailored economic development policies. 
1. Puerto Rico Within the Context of the U.S. Economy 
The Reagan Administration's announced "New Federalism" is consistent with the 
economic measures already adopted in the U.S. in the last few years. This economic 
148 See, President's Message, supra note 120. 
14. [d. 
150 [d., at 324. 
151 See, e.g., President Reagan's statements to the effect that, "taxes on all imported rum will be 
transferred to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands"; his statement that the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (ACRS) and the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) would be extended to U.S. companies in 
Puerto Rico; and his idea of furthering agricultural development by making use of the tropical 
agricultural research facility at Mayagiiez, Puerto Rico. [d., at 326. Nothing new came out of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, either. See, REPORT supra note 131. 
152 See generally Ch. II, supra. 
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program, the implementation of which would be spread out over a number of years, 
intends for the States to take charge of many current welfare programs, such as food 
stamps. At the same time, the federal government would reduce its participation and the 
consequent tax burden on individual States. The underlying assumption is that those 
states desiring to continue or to expand existing welfare programs would have to foot the 
bill with little or no federal subsidy. As a consequence, some of the measures adopted in 
the U.S. as incentives for the private sector of the economy have made Puerto Rico less 
attractive as a place for investment. 153 
It does not seem likely that the end of the Reagan Administration - were that to 
happen in 1984 - would result in the restoration of the Johnson-era federal welfare 
activism. In spite of the lack of consensus to support specific "Reaganomic" measures, the 
emerging consensus among Republicans and Democrats alike seems to be that the "Great 
Society" experiment of the Johnson years will not work. And the general philosophical 
premise of the "New Federalism" whereby the States will continue to assume greater fiscal 
responsibilities seems to form part of that emerging consensus among the leading Demo-
cratic presidential hopefuls. 
Even without the "New Federalism," the dependency model of "Commonwealth" was 
bound to fail. As pointed out in Chapter II of this work, Puerto Ricans' incomes have been 
increasingly dependent on federal transfers and government indebtedness, rather than 
on growth in production or equitable wealth distribution. Sooner or later, credit was 
bound to end or to be severely limited. And it was further delusory to suppose that U.S. 
taxpayers will continue indefinitely to subsidize an ever-increasing welfare bill to keep 
Puerto Rico's economy artificially afloat. 
The New Federalism requires that the structural flaws in Puerto Rico's economic 
development model be faced. And the CBl's main features, particularly its positive aspect 
of one-way free trade, requires that the structural flaws in the Island's political status be 
confronted. Puerto Ricans have been conditioned through Commonwealth to believe that 
independence necessarily implies economic isolation and severance of ties with, and 
presumably loss of access to, the U.S. market. Even under the least positive implementa-
tion of the CBl, Caribbean republics will have practically the same access to that market 
without the Constitutional constraints inherent to Puerto Rico's status. Puerto Rico's 
access to the U.S. market has heretofore been based on the obsolescent model ofreciproc-
ity. The CBl provides Caribbean republics free access to the U.S. market without reciproc-
ity. The CBl and the evolving international institutional arrangements which form part of 
its background since their inception at the Lome Conventions have dealt a mortal blow to 
the present colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and the U.S., and placed in 
evidence its structural incapacity as a model for economic development. 
Puerto Rico's annexation as a State of the Union - in spite of its consequent 
increased representation in the U.S. Congress - has been deemed by serious scholars in 
Puerto Rico as a practical impossibility, and an utter undesirability. 154 Statehood could not 
effect any structural changes, for statehood is the culmination of the dependence model: 
the colony with Congressional representation. The "evolution" of the Commonwealth 
model towards greater political and economic autonomy, internally and internationally, 
153 Tax cuts to individuals and corporations, and the ACRS are some examples. Although the 
latter would be extended to Puerto Rico through the CBI, its existence in the U.S. does not create any 
additional incentives for Puerto Rico. 
154 See Serrano Geyls & Gorrin Peralta, Puerto Rico y La estadidad REVISTA DEL COL. ABOG. DE P.R. 
5,5-21 (1979) [REVISTA); 41 REVISTA 1, 1-28 (1980); 42 REVISTA 1, 1-100 (1981). 
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raises serious constitutional issues which act as constraints against a sufficiently agile 
model.'55 Furthermore, in order for it to work, the ultimate product of this increased 
autonomy would so resemble independence that there would be no point in not calling it 
that. For in order to deal with the situation presented by the CBI and New Federalism 
trends, certain minimum economic powers are indispensable for Puerto Rico. Such 
powers are necessary for Puerto Rico to increase productivity and thereby decrease its 
dependence on federal transfers and indebtedness. At the same time, increased produc-
tivity makes no sense unless it carries with it a better distribution model, which of course, 
implies the creation of jobs to reduce unemployment. In order to increase productivity, 
new enterprises are necessary in the industrial, agricultural and service sectors of the 
economy. This, of course, requires skilled and unskilled labor, investment capital, and 
available markets. 
On January 25, 1982, the Puerto Rican Independence Party made public what it 
termed an "integral" plan to deal with the total breakdown of the dependency model 
which the New Federalism and the CBI foreshadow for Puerto Rico.'56 This plan con-
tained several interrelated points that could serve as the basis for a new economic 
development model. The plan emphasizes an economic policy geared towards production 
for Puerto Rico's internal market in durable consumer goods and in foodstuffs, while at 
the same time stimulating savings and foreign investment for production in areas not 
covered by local capital. This import substitution policy would be complemented by 
policies promoting technological adequacy to create jobs, and controls over immigration 
proportionate to Puerto Rico's population density. It addresses the problem of shipping 
laws and their economic effects, and the adequate linkages in the economic sectors, 
together with integral planning for additional linkages with other foreign economies. 
155 Raul Serrano Geyls, former Justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has stated that such 
autonomy as called for to meet the minimum decolonization requirements of international law is 
incompatible with the U.S. political and constitutional system. Of this "free association" concept 
embodied in international law (not to be confused with the Spanish "Free Associated State" used to 
designate the present "Commonwealth" status), Serrano Geyls wrote: 
Present North American leaders cannot ignore that the basic principles of true "free 
association" are dangerously close to the postures assumed by leaders in the South [of 
the U.S.] in the years subsequent to the Civil War, and particularly to the idea of 
"nullification" offederal powers which John Calhoun and others fervently defended in 
support of each state's sovereignty .... And neither would any member of Congress be 
willing to tell her/his constituents that a group of citizens [in Puerto Rico] will be 
granted the power to veto federal laws and opt out of the "association" whenever they 
wish, powers which the citizens of the other 50 states do not have, nor ever expect to 
have. 
The Spanish original reads as follows: 
Los lideres norteamericanos del presente no pueden desconocer que los principios 
basicos de la verdadera "Iibre asociacion" estan muy peligrosamente cerca de las 
posturas de los lideres sureiios en los aiios posteriores a la Guerra Civil y particular-
mente a la idea de "nulificacion" de los poderes federales que en apoyo de la soberania 
de cada estado John Calhoun y otros defendieran adorosamente ... Y tam poco estaria 
dispuesto ningun miembro del Congreso a decirle a sus electores que se va a conceder a 
un grupo de ciudadanos la facultad de vetar las leyes federales y de salirse de la 
"asociacion" cuando asi 10 deseen, facultades que no tienen ni nunca esperan tener los 
ciudadanos de los 50 estados. 
EI Nuevo Dia, Sept. 10, 1978, at 20. See also, Enrique Cordova Diaz, id, at 20; contra Jaime Fuster, id. 
156 PARTIDO INDEPENDENTISTA PUERTORRIQUENO, PLAN DE RECONSTRUCI('lN NACIONAL: DEL MOD-
ELO DE CRECIMIENTO DEPENDIENTE AL MODELO DE CRECIMIENTO AUTOSTENDIO E INTERDEPENDENCIA 
EQUIILIBRADA (1982). 
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Finally, it proposes the use of federal funds in the nature of block-grants, consistent with 
both the New Federalism's reduction of federal transfers, and Puerto Rico's economic 
development requirements, to promote new mixed-capital ventures. 157 In a post-in-
dependence context, these block-grants would be consonant with the precedent estab-
lished by the Lome Conventions' financial aid component. The financial aid or block-
grants would begin at current levels (for a number of years to be negotiated) and be 
gradually reduced thereafter as the Puerto Rican economy became self-sustaining. Con-
tinued access to the U.S. market would be consistent with CBI trends and Caribbean 
nations' current international economic relations. 
Any program for decolonization which would follow these general guidelines would 
ensure a smooth and viable transition towards Puerto Rican juridical sovereign equality. 
2. The Bridge Over Troubled Waters 
The implementation of a program such as this requires a clear U.S. commitment to 
pursue a decolonization policy. It would place Puerto Rico on the road to economic 
self-sustenance, making independence - juridical sovereign equality - a viable option. 
Not only would independence be a viable option for the continued economic devel-
opment of Puerto Rico, but a viable option for other Caribbean republics to work with the 
United States towards economic interdependence in a way which could rationally con-
front, in the words of President Reagan, the "economic, political and security challenges 
in the Caribbean Basin," which are indeed "formidable."158 For, as stated earlier, Puerto 
Rico has one of the most developed infrastructures of the Third World countries, 
particularly of the Caribbean region. The multiplicity of production systems in the 
Caribbean would make Puerto Rico's contribution to regional integration not only plausi-
ble, but rational and desirable. 159 The inextricable historical linkages of Puerto Rico with 
the U.S. could thus continue on a different level- a level which would promote economic 
well-being and political good faith, consistent with present world configuration. New 
international institutional arrangements would inevitably develop. In such circumstances, 
a more attuned CBI, one which would take into account the achievements of Lome and 
other international legal and economic precedents, could be orchestrated. What Gillian 
White has observed of the advantages of institutional arrangements developed in this 
wave of post-war institution-building in a Lome context, would be equally applicable to 
U.S. economic interests in the region: 
Lawyers who may be asked to advise firms investing in these countries or 
tendering for contracts have the advantage of a well-constructed and appar-
ently clear and workable set of provisions. Maybe there are some helpful 
precedents here for future trading and cooperation arrangements between 
other groups of countries in the rich North and the poor South. 160 
Perhaps the time has come to stop the rhetorical idealizing which casts Puerto Rico in 
157 Id., at 14-18. 
158 See, President's Message, supra note 119. 
159 Puerto Rico's well-educated and easily trainable work force make it a fertile ground for 
diverse economic productivity that would complement that of other Caribbean nations. On Puerto 
Rico's capacity for high technology productivity (technological adequacy, of course, being more 
flexibly and efficiently handled through juridical sovereignty), see Curwood, Puerto Rico, a High-
Technology Haven, in Boston Sunday Globe, Nov. 20, 1983, at AI. 
160 White, The Lome Convention -A Lawyer's View, 1 EUROPEAN L. REV. 197,212 (1976). 
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an historically irrelevant context as a bridge between two cultures. Eighty-five years of 
colonialism have not erased Puerto Rico's cultural character as a Latin American -
particularly Caribbean - nation. And no one has made a strong case for the need to 
bridge these cultures. No one even talks about the gaps between the U.S. and French, 
German, or Italian cultures. Modern interdependence, however, makes the need to 
bridge the economic gap which separates the U.S. and the Caribbean imperative. Eco-
nomic bridges are undoubtedly necessary between the U.S. and Western Europe. But the 
economic bridges toward the Caribbean are urgently required. For, at this stage of 
international institution-building, the economic waters, south, towards the Caribbean, 
may be far more turbulent than the Atlantic Ocean. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this monograph, I stated that my purpose was to attempt an 
exercise in post-independence advocacy. Puerto Rico's colonial status has proved politi-
cally and economically obsolete. The history of international institution-building in 
Europe since the Second World War - particularly the Lome Conventions - has 
provided the world with the tools with which to deal more wisely and less painfully with 
post-colonial, North-South relations. While the Caribbean Basin Initiative contains seri-
ous flaws which, if uncorrected, will lead it towards self-defeat, it provides a small step in 
the right direction. More than a minimal awareness is necessary, however, to rescue the 
initiative from the cold-war economic games that bear little relevance to the real problems 
of the region. The colonial status of Puerto Rico is a constant reminder of that cold-war 
ideology. Puerto Rico's decolonization and reinstatement into the community of Latin 
American nations is an essential first step towards Caribbean regional integration. Fur-
thermore, decolonization of this Caribbean island will reduce the dissonance between 
economic inequality and juridical sovereign equality in the international arena. The 
economic benefits accruing from international integration in an atmosphere of healthy 
interdependence between the Caribbean and the U.S. will be quantifiable and quite 
conside"rable. But, as Bergsten has pointed out, other less tangible benefits will arise from 
a new set of international norms in the region. These "less tangible effects of international 
institutional arrangements are probably more important."161 He continues: 
The very existence of such cooperative structures, more than the specific 
rules themselves, inspires confidence in both private sectors and government 
circles around the world that economic progress will not be disrupted by 
conflict among nations. International agreements strengthen the hand of 
outward-looking forces within each government. And they promote transna-
tional coalitions among these forces, which often prove importantly reinforc-
ing in pursuing internationalist activities. 162 
The task will not be easy. Some existing conflicts in the region may be insurmounta-
ble, but they need not be generalized. From a juridical level of equality and from the 
cultural vantage points that will recognize and respect individual dignity and national 
integrity, the peoples of our hemisphere are awaiting a signal for trust. The decoloniza-
tion of Puerto Rico is an essential first step in ushering into our hemisphere, and into the 
Caribbean in particular, the spirit of Lome. And in the game of post-independence 
advocacy, good will is the limit. 
161 Bergsten, supra note 7, at 362. 
162 /d. 
